Abstract
I SEE nothing to criticize in Mr. Dixon's middle paragraph, wherein he accurately summarizes some of the definitions of mechanics, except that I should prefer to express the meaning of his last sentence by saying that, if in any department something simulated the functions of, say, energy, without obeying its precise mechanical laws, then the distinction between energy and that something should be clearly recognized, and another name be given to it.
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LODGE, O. Force and Determinism. Nature 44, 272–273 (1891). https://doi.org/10.1038/044272d0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/044272d0


