Francis Bacon and Scientific Method¹

Abstract

II. THE natural history, selected, arranged, and recorded by the rules described in the previous article, forms the basis on which scientific knowledge must be built. Bacon's next task was to construct a logical instrument by which a knowledge of general laws can be erected on this basis. Plainly the kind of reasoning which is needed is inductive. But Bacon objected both to the order and the form of reasoning which he found in current inductive arguments. Those who use them jump directly from particular facts to extremely sweeping generalisations, and they then deduce propositions of medium generality from these generalisations by means of syllogistic reasoning. Now Bacon's view is that there should be a very gradual ascent from particulars through principles of slowly increasing generality to the widest generalisations. Conversely, there should be a very gradual descent from the widest generalisations through principles of slowly decreasing generality to new particular facts. In the ascending scale each stage covers all the facts below it and extends very slightly beyond them. We then deduce observable, but not hitherto observed, consequences from the hypothesis and see whether they are true. If they are found to be so we can accept the hypothesis and go on to generalise it a little further. Thus the descending scale serves to test the stages in the ascending scale.