Abstract
A quantitative treatment shows that the nuclear balance will not necessarily be upset if both the United States and the Soviet Union replace missile launchers with single warheads by multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.
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References
Hearings on Authorization for Military Procurement, R and D FY 1970, and Reserve Strength before Committee on Armed Services, Part 2, 1709 (US Senate, 1969).
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BELLANY, I. MIRVs and the Strategic Balance. Nature 226, 412–413 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1038/226412a0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/226412a0
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