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Ethics: The good life

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Pascal Boyer assesses what science has to say about morals.

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Boyer, P. Ethics: The good life. Nature 469, 297 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1038/469297a

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  1. â&#x80&#x9cTo be persuaded that some actions are immoral because they diminish well-being, people need to accept that welfare is the most relevant criterion of morality, which may require a special education.â&#x80&#x9d

    No doubt a â&#x80&#x9cspecial educationâ&#x80&#x9d could instill acceptance of Harrisâ&#x80&#x99s claim that â&#x80&#x9cwelfareâ&#x80&#x9d is moralityâ&#x80&#x99s sole foundational criterion. So? A special education could do that for almost any claim. The problem is, this particular claim is a premiss, not an observation â&#x80&#x94 no matter how long or expertly Harris tap-dances. It has no scientific content. Harrisonâ&#x80&#x99s effort to derive all â&#x80&#x9coughtsâ&#x80&#x9d from some foundational â&#x80&#x9cisâ&#x80&#x9d starts, like all such attempts, with a humungous â&#x80&#x9coughtâ&#x80&#x9d (welfare-ought-to-be-promoted) and ends up as yet another demonstration of intellectual circular motion.

    His apparent insistence on treating religion and his own brand of utilitarianism as exhaustive alternatives is one of the strangest things about this imbroglio. That Hume was right, and Ought cannot be derived from Is, does not obviously favor theism. A naked theological Is (God exists), even if affirmed, sheds no more light on the mystery of right and wrong than any purely material Is.

    By the way, isnâ&#x80&#x99t it clear that when it comes to religion, Harris, like Christopher Hitchens, radiates as much hatred, overweening pride, rage, and contempt for unbelievers as any of the religious grotesques that populate his own demonology?

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