The debate over publishing potentially dangerous research on flu viruses would benefit from a closer look at history, argue David Kaiser and Jonathan D. Moreno.
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Kaiser, D., Moreno, J. Self-censorship is not enough. Nature 492, 345–347 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1038/492345a
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/492345a
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Adriano Aguzzi
Kaiser & Moreno pose the rhetorical question: "no matter the field of research, can anyone be expected to step outside the excitement and momentum of their own work to make objective decisions in risky situations?". Indeed, most scientists can be expected to do exactly that.
I work on prions in my lab, as well as in the labs of befriended investigators, these questions are raised at every weekly lab meeting. We debate among ourselves and, more often than not, we decide to forego exciting research because we deem it too dangerous. Through such debates we have voluntarily avoided, for example, many experiments on human prions. As another example, we have never made lentiviral vectors containing mutated prion genes. Moreover, as university faculty we are acutely aware of our dual research and educational roles, which entails a particular duty to protect our young coworkers from inexperience-related hazards.
I do not disapprove of governmental regulation – but in my experience most scientists know very well the boundariers between the reasonable and the hazardous – and respect them strictly, as can (and should) be expected from any good, responsible member of a civilized society.