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Auctions made more efficient

Nature (2003)Cite this article

New kind of auction balances supply, demand and complex bidding strategies.

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References

  1. Porter, D., Rassenti, S., Roopnarine, A. & Smith, V. Combinatorial auction design. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, published online, doi:10.1073/pnas.1633736100 (2003).

  2. Yang, I., Jeong, H., Kahng, B. & Barabási, A.-L. Emerging behavior in electronic bidding. Physical Review E, 68, 016102, (2003).

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Authors
  1. Philip Ball
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Ball, P. Auctions made more efficient. Nature (2003). https://doi.org/10.1038/news030728-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/news030728-4

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