Fig. 2: Defense participation was impacted by the economic costs of leaving.
From: Prosocial preferences can escalate intergroup conflicts by countering selfish motivations to leave
a Participants (n = 122) indicated if they wanted to leave the conflict for each possible cost of leaving, with costs varying between 0 and 20 EMU. Defenders were less likely to leave as the cost of leaving increased. b Average group-level contributions (n = 40 groups) to the conflict pool of attackers (red) and defenders (blue) per block. Groups contributed more EMU to conflict as the cost of leaving increased. Contributions were highest when leaving was not possible. Yellow pie charts show overall EMU wasted on conflict as a percentage of participants’ endowment for each leaving cost. More EMU were wasted as the cost of leaving increased. Most EMU were wasted when leaving was not possible (see pie chart X). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. Dots show averages per groups. c Leaving was the superior strategy for defenders (n = 40 groups). Defenders earned more EMU when they left (light blue), regardless of the cost of leaving and the number of other defenders who stayed. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. Dots show averages per participants who stayed in the conflict.
