Table 1 Comparison with prior works

From: Demonstration of high-reconfigurability and low-power strong physical unclonable function empowered by FeFET cycle-to-cycle variation and charge-domain computing

Reference

This work

IEDM 202339

NE 201829

NC 202128

SA 202230

NE 202135

NE 202334

Roel, M.23

Technology

FeFET

FeFET

RRAM

RRAM

RRAM

GFET

STT-MRAM

CMOS (APUF)

PUF type

Strong

Strong

Strong

Weak/

Strong

Weak

In middlea

Weak

Strong

Computation mode

Charge domain

Current domain

Current domain

Current domain

Current domain

Analog ADC

N/A

Delay path

Uniformity

50.00%

49.5%

49.5-50%

49.02%

50.13%

~50%

Not reported

Not reported

NIST test

Passed

Passed

Passed

Passed

Passed

Not reported

Passed

Not reported

Uniqueness

49.98%

50.01%

50.0%

48.3%

50.52%

47–50%

49.99%

47.13%

BER

0.7%

@85 °C

1.7% @100 °C

1.1–3% @90 °C

~0%

@85 °C

~5%

@100 °C

0-7%

@125 °C

0%

3.04%

Reconfigurability

50.02%

Not reported

N/A

40.06%

Concealableb

34–50%

N/A

N/A

Scalability

High

Low

Low

Low

Low

Low

High

Low

Readout energy (Basic)

1.89fJ

per bitc

3fJ

per bitd

20fJ

per bite

51.2fJ

per bit

2.404pJ

per bit

<5pJ

per bit

Not reported

1.1pJ

per bit

Readout energy (Enhancedf)

15.67fJ

per bitc

N/A

N/A

102fJ

per bit

N/A

N/A

N/A

Not reported

Area per cell

1 μm2

~2500 

μm2

~3.5 μm2

~0.01 mm2

>0.75 μm2

>0.5 μm2g

Not reported

0.213 mm2

ML attack accuracy

52.1%

~50%

55%

54%

N/A

52.5%

N/A

100%

  1. aThe PUF cannot generate an exponentially large number of CRPs as strong PUFs but is able to generate more CRPs than weak PUFs.
  2. bConcealable PUF means that the PUF can hide the stored data (i.e., the generated CRPs) when attacked and recover them afterward. Note that the CRP space before and after hiding is the same without reconfiguration.
  3. cFeFET-based PUF array, SA, and XOR gates are included in the evaluation.
  4. dHSPICE simulation result.
  5. eThe energy of the peripherals is not considered.
  6. fSome PUFs are enhanced using XOR or recurrent structure to obtain the listed ML attack resilience.
  7. gThe data include the channel area of GFETs only.