Fig. 1: Illustration of the game and Experiment 1.

a, Illustration of the setup of the investment game. b, The ideological manifold for endowment distribution (10, 2, 2, 2). The plot shows a visualization of a space of redistribution mechanisms defined by parameters w and v in two dimensions. Each red dot is a mechanism, and distances between dots conserve dissimilarities in the (average) relative payout to virtual players (both head and tail). Dot numbers denote bins of mechanism parameter w (1, lowest; 10, highest) and shading denotes bins of v (light, more relative; dark, more absolute). Inset, example payouts to head (circles) and tail (triangles) players under the canonical mechanisms used as baselines against which to test the AI. Under strict egalitarian, payouts decline to head and tail players. Under libertarian, there is great inequality between head and tail players. Under liberal egalitarian, the head player stops contributing, so payouts decline for both head and tail players. c, Average relative contributions (as a fraction of endowment) over 10 rounds (x axis) in Exp. 1 for three different initial endowment conditions. Under strict egalitarian redistribution, tail player (triangles) contributions are higher when initial endowments are lower, but head player (circles) contributions do not differ. Under libertarian, head player contributions increase with equality, but tail player contributions remain constant. Head player contributions increase strongly with endowment under liberal egalitarian. d, Illustration of our agent design pipeline.