Fig. 3: Percentage of rounds for each type of anticipation of coordination success and behavioural deviation from expectations for competition and cooperation.
From: Honour, competition and cooperation across 13 societies

a, Anticipation of coordination success. The sum of an individual’s own contribution and expected contribution from the other in a given round in the step-level PGG was grouped into three categories, where ‘failed coordination’ indicates that the sum contribution did not reach the first provision point (that is, 12 MUs), ‘less-efficient coordination’ indicates that the sum contribution only reached the first provision point but not the second one (that is, 16 MUs) and ‘efficient coordination’ indicates that the sum contribution reached the second provision point. b, Behavioural deviation from expectations for competition. In the contest game, the deviations of an individual’s own competition from their expected competition from the other in a given round were grouped into four categories, where ‘underinvested competition’ indicates that the individual’s own competition was less than the expected competition from the other, ‘tie’ indicates that the individual competed at exactly the same level as the expected level from the other, ‘efficient competition’ indicates that the individual’s own competition was just one MU more than the expected competition from the other and ‘less-efficient competition’ indicates that the individual’s own competition was at least two MUs more than the expected competition from the other. c, Behavioural deviation from expectations for cooperation. In the step-level PGG, the deviations of an individual’s own contribution from their expected contribution from the other in a given round were grouped into three categories, where ‘underinvested cooperation’ indicates that the individual’s own contribution was less than the expected contribution from the other, ‘conditional cooperation’ indicates that the individual contributed exactly the same level as the expected level from the other and ‘unconditional cooperation’ indicates that the individual’s own contribution was more than the expected contribution from the other. Societies are sorted in ascending order according to societal-level honour (that is, the societal mean of perceived normative honour values), from the bottom upwards on the y axis.