Figure 3 | Scientific Reports

Figure 3

From: When agreement-accepting free-riders are a necessary evil for the evolution of cooperation

Figure 3

Pure defection is stable in PC games but not in RC games. A mixed state between cooperative proposers and acceptors is stable in both scenarios. Replicator dynamics for a subset of strategies in one-shot games. Replicator dynamics for an infinite population with (P, C, D), (A, C, D), and (N, D) strategies for RC (left) and PC (right) games. Small filled (empty) circles represent stable (unstable) rest points. We assumed \(\epsilon \) = 0.25 and δ = 4. Several filled (empty) circles along the ACD-ND axis reveal that the whole interval is stable (unstable) in the axis; the grey filled circle represents the change of stability in the axis for the PC game. Regions where the dynamics lead to a mixed state of (A, C, D) with (P, C, D) or (N, D) in the PC game are separated by a black curve. Figures obtained with Dynamo58.

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