Table 2 Payoff matrix under cooperation or non-cooperation.
From: Analysis of long-term strategies of riparian countries in transboundary river basins
Country 1 | Country 2 | Country 3 | |
|---|---|---|---|
Cooperation (\({x}_{1}^{(3)}\)) | Non-cooperation (\({x}_{2}^{(3)}\)) | ||
Cooperation (\({x}_{1}^{(1)})\) | Cooperation (\({x}_{1}^{(2)}\)) | (\({U}_{111}^{\left(1\right)},{U}_{111}^{\left(2\right)},{U}_{111}^{\left(3\right)})\) | (\({U}_{112}^{(1)},{U}_{112}^{(2)},{U}_{112}^{(3)})\) |
Non-cooperation (\({x}_{2}^{(2)}\)) | (\({U}_{121}^{(1)},{U}_{121}^{(2)},{U}_{121}^{(3)})\) | (\({U}_{122}^{(1)},{U}_{122}^{(2)},{U}_{122}^{(3)})\) | |
Non-cooperation (\({x}_{2}^{(1)}\)) | Cooperation (\({x}_{1}^{(2)})\) | (\({U}_{211}^{(1)},{U}_{211}^{(2)},{U}_{211}^{(3)})\) | (\({U}_{212}^{(1)},{U}_{212}^{(2)},{U}_{212}^{(3)})\) |
Non-cooperation (\({x}_{2}^{(2)}\)) | (\({U}_{221}^{\left(1\right)},{U}_{221}^{\left(2\right)},{U}_{221}^{\left(3\right)})\) | (\({U}_{222}^{(1)},{U}_{222}^{(2)},{U}_{222}^{(3)})\) | |
