Table 1 Settings of the parameters.
Group | Parameter | Revenue | Cost | Meaning |
---|---|---|---|---|
Supervisors | \({P_1}\) | \(\checkmark\) | Benefits for supervisors upon successful collusion: Accepting various forms of bribes from subordinates, such as entertainment, money, and goods. Interest stands as the primary motivating factor compelling superiors to embrace risk-bearing47. | |
\({I_1}\) | \(\checkmark\) | Rewards for safety performance. | ||
\({T_1}\) | \(\checkmark\) | “Strict regulation” additional costs: the value of the labor, time, and effort expended in comparison to the “collusion”. | ||
Subordinates | \({T_2}\) | \(\checkmark\) | “Compliance with rules” costs: the costs associated with prioritizing safety, referring to the value of the additional labor, time, and effort expended. | |
\({I_2}\) | \(\checkmark\) | Rewards for safety performance. | ||
\({P_2}\) | \(\checkmark\) | Cost reductions for subordinates in the event of successful collusion: cost savings from “taking shortcuts”, swapping materials, etc. Although realizing cost savings by neglecting adherence to building standards can yield notable benefits for practitioners, it also ushers in significant safety risks48. | ||
\({T_3}\) | \(\checkmark\) | “Non-compliance with rules” strategy when being “strict regulation” causes reputational damage: loss of trust in subordinates by supervisors and a decline in leadership within subordinates. Internal leadership within the construction team primarily hinges on the guiding influence of the foremen. Once the workers’ sense of alignment with the foremen wanes, sustaining the foremen’s control over the team becomes challenging15. | ||
r | \(\checkmark\) | Moral identity coefficient: the negative impact of unsafe behaviour on work engagement. The higher the value, the stronger the guilt about the rule-breaking behaviour49. | ||
Rule variables | R | \(\checkmark\) | Negative impact on safety responsibility: China’s Regulations on the Management of Construction Work Safety stipulate that all parties involved in the construction have supervisory responsibilities. | |
F | \(\checkmark\) | Safety penalties: established in accordance with the safety rules within the construction site and the relevant laws and regulations. | ||
Influencing parameters | \(\theta\) | The safety level of a construction site: the root cause that affects the overall safety management systemcite50. Simplified representation as the likelihood of an accident occurring. | ||
W | Supervisor-subordinate intimacy: The primary basis for judging the likelihood of a subordinate’s perceived success in a collusion. Simplified in this paper as the starting benefit of the “non-compliance with rules” strategy. | |||
H | Security Perception Judgement: The main basis for judging the adoption of collusion strategies by superiors. Simplified in this paper as the starting benefit of a “collusion” strategy. |