Table 1 Model parameters and implications.

From: NEV battery recycling innovation strategy considering pro-social behavior from the game theory perspective

Parameters

Implications

\(\Pi_{P}\)

Initial revenue for NEV manufacturers

\(C_{P}\)

Costs of NEV manufacturers to adopt technological innovations

\(\delta_{P}\)

Technology synergy benefit for NEV manufacturers

\(d\)

Unit cost savings for battery manufacturers using technology innovations

\(\gamma\)

Unit revenue increase rate for NEV manufacturers when choose strategy \(I\)

\(\theta\)

Unit revenue increase rate for recyclers when choose strategy \(I\)

\(\Pi_{R}\)

Initial revenue for recyclers

\(C_{R}\)

Costs of recyclers to adopt technological innovations

\(\delta_{R}\)

Technology synergy benefit for recyclers

\(E\)

Additional revenue gained by battery recyclers from echelon utilization after adopting technological innovations

\(K_{0}\)

Social reputation for recyclers’ technology innovation

\(\alpha\)

Hitchhiking benefit coefficient of recyclers

\(\beta\)

\(\mu_{1}\)

\(\mu_{2}\)

Hitchhiking benefit coefficient of NEV manufacturers

Level of prosocial behavior of consumers when recyclers innovate technology

Level of prosocial behavior of consumers when recyclers not innovate technology

\(K_{G}\)

Government subsidies for technological innovations