Table 1 Summary of parameters.

R_g

The ecological benefits of shared recycling

R_g′

The ecological benefits for the government when the manufacturer builds a recycling system without the participation of recyclers

U_g

The basic benefit from shared recycling under the PS strategy (including social credibility, performance assessment, and economic benefits)

C_g

The regulatory cost of shared recycling

C_g′

The ecological remediation costs owing to the failure of shared recycling

τ₀

The manufacturer’s self-set annual target recycling volumes

τ₁

The annual recycling volumes under the PP strategy

τ₂

The annual recycling volumes under the AP strategy

e

The fund reduction per unit when the manufacturer achieves the recycling target

k

The penalty fine per unit when the manufacturer fails to achieve the target

u_m

The net income per unit for recycling under the PP strategy

r_m

The recycling service fee per unit charged to the recycler (the revenues from shared recycling business) under the AP strategy

\({r}_{m^{\prime} }\)

The revenues per unit from the recycling and reuse of their own products under the AP strategy

C_m

The cost of recycling business per unit under the AP strategy

η₁

The number of recyclers participating in sharing under the government’s NS

η₂

The number of recyclers participating in sharing under the government’s PS

C_s

The costs to develop a reverse logistics network system for shared recycling

R_m

The reputational and image benefits when the manufacturer achieves recycling targets under the government’s PS

C_o

The manufacturer’s opportunity costs under the PP strategy under the government’s PS

\({l}_{m^{\prime} }\)

The indirect losses owing to the government’s NS under the AP strategy

μ_m

The probability of the manufacturer’s speculative behavior (subsidy fraud, free riding on sharing information, etc.)

i_m

The manufacturer’s gains from speculative behavior

p_m

The liquidated damages paid to recyclers for the manufacturer’s speculation

f

The fine the government imposes for the manufacturer’s speculation

l_m

The manufacturer’s losses owing to speculation by recyclers

r_t

The recycling income per unit (which does not change whether the recycler participates in sharing or not)

C_t

The recycling cost per unit under the NP strategy

r_m

The recycling cost per unit under the P strategy

σ₁

The annual recycling volumes under the NP strategy

σ₂

The annual recycling volumes under the P strategy and the manufacturer’s AP strategy

σ₃

The annual recycling volumes under the P strategy, while the manufacturer adopts the PP strategy with the government’s PS strategy

s

The subsidy per unit from the government for the increasing recycling volumes

R_t

The reputational and image benefits under the P strategy with the government’s PS strategy

ΔC_t

The cost savings for the construction and management of the recycling network system

C_p

The potential losses from information sharing

\({C}_{o^{\prime} }\)

The opportunity cost under the NP strategy when the peers participate in sharing

μ_t

The probability of the recycler’s speculative behavior (providing false information and breach of contract)

b

The deposit paid to the manufacturer once the recycler participates in sharing

i_t

The recycler’s gains from speculative behavior

p_t

The liquidated damages paid to manufacturers for the recycler’s speculation

l_t

The recycler’s losses owing to the manufacturers’ speculation