Table 2 Profit matrix of tripartite game.
Manufacturer | HFCV | Consumers | Manufacturer benefits | HFCV benefits | Customer benefits |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
R&D | Reform | Choose | \(P+\Delta P-C-\Delta C+A+G\) | \(M+\Delta M-L-\Delta {L}_{1}+G\) | \(Q+\Delta Q-F-\Delta F+S\) |
Not choose | \(P+\Delta P-C-\Delta C+A\) | \(M-L-\Delta {L}_{1}\) | \(Q-F\) | ||
No reform | Choose | \(P+\Delta P-C-\Delta C+A+G\) | \(M-L-G\) | \(Q+\Delta Q-F-\Delta F\) | |
Not choose | \(P-C-\Delta C+A\) | \(M-L\) | \(Q-F\) | ||
No R&D | Reform | Choose | \(P-C-G\) | \(M+\Delta M-L-\Delta {L}_{1}-\Delta {L}_{2}+G\) | \(Q+\Delta Q-F-\Delta F+S\) |
Not choose | \(P-C-G\) | \(M-L-\Delta {L}_{1}\) | \(Q-F\) | ||
No reform | Choose | \(P-C-G\) | \(M-L-\Delta {L}_{2}-G\) | \(Q+\Delta Q-F-\Delta F\) | |
Not choose | \(P-C\) | \(M-L\) | \(Q-F\) |