Table 1 Details of model’s parameters.

k

Local government A’s RIIL ratio coefficient.

0 < k < 1

(M Zhang et al., 2019)

m

When the local government A is unwilling to cooperate, it can complete the ratio coefficient of RIIL.

0 < m < 1

(Heberer, Trappel (2013))

B_l

Potential benefits to local governments if RIIL is completed (ecosystem service value).

B_l ≥ 0

(M Masiero et al., 2022; AM Tedesco et al., 2023)

C_a

Cost of local government A’s RIIL (engineering costs, compensation payments, and potential costs).

C_a ≥ 0

(F Wu, 2022)

C_b

Cost of local government B’s RIIL (engineering costs, compensation payments, and potential costs).

C_b ≥ 0

(F Wu, 2022)

F_a

Local government A can obtain financial special funds from the superior government through RIIL.

F_a ≥ 0

(Z Jiang et al., 2023)

F_b

Local government B can obtain financial special funds from the superior government through RIIL.

F_b ≥ 0

(Z Jiang et al., 2023)

Q_s

Benefits to superior government from RIIL (urban construction land quotas).

Q_s > 0

(Z Zhang et al., 2019)

r

The reputation loss of superior government.

r > 0

(M Zhang et al., 2019)

c

The administrative cost of superior government.

c > 0

(M Zhang et al., 2019)

p

The penalty for non-cooperative local government behaviors, including shirking responsibility and delaying the implementation of projects.

p > 0

(M Zhang et al., 2019)