Table 1 Description of Parameters in the Evolutionary Game Model.
Notation | Explanation |
|---|---|
\({R}_{1}\) | The benefits obtained from green innovation in manufacturing enterprises |
\({R}_{2}\) | The benefits obtained from greenwashing practices by manufacturing enterprises |
\({C}_{1}\) | The cost of green innovation for manufacturing enterprises |
\({C}_{2}\) | The cost of greenwashing behavior for manufacturing enterprises |
\({R}_{3}\) | The governance benefits that green innovation in manufacturing enterprises brings to the government |
\({C}_{3}\) | The governance costs that greenwashing behavior in manufacturing enterprises imposes on the government |
\({U}_{1}\) | The utility that the public derives from purchasing green products |
\({U}_{2}\) | The utility of the public purchasing greenwashed products |
\({C}_{4}\) | The cost of stringent government regulation |
\(P\) | The benefits of issuing green credit to green innovation enterprises under strict government regulation |
\(Q\) | The losses incurred by greenwashing enterprises due to the revocation of green certification under strict government regulation |
\(F\) | The reputational rewards that the government receives from the public participating in supervision under strict government regulation |
\(G\) | The losses brought by public reporting under loose government regulation |
\(J\) | The loss of investment and innovation suppression in green innovation for enterprises under loose government regulation |
\({C}_{5}\) | The cost of public participation in supervision |
\(L\) | The supportive motivation of public participation in supervision for manufacturing enterprises’ green innovation |
\(M\) | The resistive pressure of public participation in supervision against manufacturing enterprises’ greenwashing behavior |
\(H\) | The rights protection under strict government regulation when the public participates in supervision |
\(I\) | The rights damage under loose government regulation when the public participates in supervision |
\(\alpha\) | Public concern for the greenness of manufacturing enterprises |
\(x\) | The probability of manufacturing enterprises’ green innovation |
\(y\) | The probability of strict government regulation |
\(z\) | The probability of public participation in supervision |
