Table 2 Strategy Combinations and Payoff Matrices of the Participants.
Government | Public | Manufacturing enterprises | |
|---|---|---|---|
Green innovation x | Greenwashing \(1-x\) | ||
Strict regulation y | Participation in supervision z | \((Enterprise)(1+\alpha )\,{R}_{1}-{C}_{1}+P+L\) | \((1-\alpha )\,{R}_{2}-{C}_{2}-Q-M\) |
\((Government){R}_{3}-{C}_{4}+F-P\) | \(-{C}_{3}-{C}_{4}+F\) | ||
\(\begin{array}{c}(Public){U}_{1}-{C}_{5}-L+H\end{array}\) | \({U}_{2}-{C}_{5}+M+H\) | ||
Non-participation in supervision \(1-z\) | \((Enterprise)(1+\alpha )\,{R}_{1}-{C}_{1}+P\) | \((1-\alpha )\,{R}_{2}-{C}_{2}-Q\) | |
\((Government){R}_{3}-{C}_{4}-P\) | \(-{C}_{3}-{C}_{4}\) | ||
\((Public){U}_{1}\) | \({U}_{2}\) | ||
Loose regulation \(1-y\) | Participation in supervision z | \((Enterprise)(1+\alpha )\,{R}_{1}-{C}_{1}+L\) | \((1-\alpha )\,{R}_{2}-{C}_{2}-M\) |
\((Government){R}_{3}-G-J\) | \(-{C}_{3}-G\) | ||
\(\begin{array}{c}(Public){U}_{1}-{C}_{5}-L-I\end{array}\) | \({U}_{2}-{C}_{5}+M-I\) | ||
Non-participation in supervision \(1-z\) | \((Enterprise)(1+\alpha )\,{R}_{1}-{C}_{1}\) | \((1-\alpha )\,{R}_{2}-{C}_{2}\) | |
\((Government)\,{R}_{3}-J\) | \(-{C}_{3}\) | ||
\((Public){U}_{1}\) | \({U}_{2}\) | ||
