Abstract
Social insurance contribution evasion is a pervasive issue, particularly in China, with significant socioeconomic repercussions. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving local governments, enterprises, and employees to explore evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) under various scenarios. We identify four potential ESS within the game system, with the final outcome depending on central government rewards for local governments’ enforcement efforts, penalties imposed by enterprises on employees for work indolence, and employee reciprocity toward compliant enterprises. When these three parameters exceed critical thresholds, the system converges toward an optimal strategy combination characterized by strict collection, compliant contribution, and active engagement. Measures that can accelerate convergence toward the ideal equilibrium include reducing the cost of strict collection, increasing penalties for non-compliant enterprises, strengthening employee whistleblowing incentives, and lowering social insurance contributions. These findings offer valuable insights for policymakers to curb contribution evasion.
Data availability
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.
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Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72474183), Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education (25YJC840018), and the National Social Science Fund of China (23ZDA099).
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Conceptualization: Minglu Wang and Yifan Pan; methodology: Minglu Wang and Peng Jing; formal analysis and investigation: Minglu Wang, Yifan Pan, and Peng Jing; visualization: Yifan Pan; writing—original draft preparation: Minglu Wang; writing—review and editing: Yifan Pan and Peng Jing; funding acquisition: Minglu Wang and Peng Jing.
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Wang, M., Pan, Y. & Jing, P. Understanding social insurance contribution evasion through evolutionary game theory: insights from China. Humanit Soc Sci Commun (2026). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-06773-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-06773-4
