Fig. 2
From: Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

The nonlinear public goods function influences growth rate differences and long-term stable states. aāc For βā>āĻ, differences in intrinsic growth rates can have a maximum at a fraction of cooperators between 0 and 1. The number and positions of equilibria then critically depends on neighborhood size, and saddle-node bifurcations are possible. These patterns are also reflected in the individual-based model, revealing large regions of coexistence (shown in c). dāf For βā<āĻ, differences in intrinsic growth rates tend to be monotonically increasing, and we can observe unstable coexistence and a form of a transcritical bifurcation pattern. The individual based model switches sharply from all-C to all-D (shown in f). We used αC,Dāā=āā1.0, Ī“C,Dāā=āā0.1, Īŗāā=āā0.5, and Kāā=āā1000. Stochastic simulation results were obtain from 200 independent simulations started from 90 C and 10 D cells