Fig. 4
From: Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

Differences in neighborhood size (public good sensitivity) can destabilize all-C but increase the coexistence regime. In all panels: Kā=ā1000, Ī“1ā=āĪ“2ā=ā0.1, γā=ā1.0/day, Ļā=ā2.0, βā=ā5.0 and Īŗā=ā0.5/day. a Temporal trajectories of the fraction of cooperators for two different values of nC, where we considered a resident population of defectors (xD(0)/Kā=ā1āĪ“/α) that is invaded by a small population of cooperators (xC(0)ā=ā10), which move toward coexistence. The time to reach coexistence critically depends on nDāāānC. b For fixed nDā=ā30 the saddle-node bifurcation pattern of Fig.Ā 3b (where nDā=ānC) changes such that the all-C state becomes entirely unstable, and we see a shift in the critical value of nC above which cooperation is lost. c Smaller values of, e.g., nDā=ā15, act against defectors. Then we predict an increase in range of values of nC for which cooperators and defectors stably coexist