Fig. 4 | Communications Biology

Fig. 4

From: Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

Fig. 4

Differences in neighborhood size (public good sensitivity) can destabilize all-C but increase the coexistence regime. In all panels: K = 1000, Ī“1 = Γ2 = 0.1, γ = 1.0/day, Ļƒā€‰= 2.0, β = 5.0 and κ = 0.5/day. a Temporal trajectories of the fraction of cooperators for two different values of nC, where we considered a resident population of defectors (xD(0)/K = 1āˆ’Ī“/α) that is invaded by a small population of cooperators (xC(0) = 10), which move toward coexistence. The time to reach coexistence critically depends on nDā€‰āˆ’ā€‰nC. b For fixed nD = 30 the saddle-node bifurcation pattern of Fig.Ā 3b (where nD = nC) changes such that the all-C state becomes entirely unstable, and we see a shift in the critical value of nC above which cooperation is lost. c Smaller values of, e.g., nD = 15, act against defectors. Then we predict an increase in range of values of nC for which cooperators and defectors stably coexist

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