Fig. 5
From: Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

Fluctuations in neighborhood size can stabilize cooperation. a Schematic overview of the quasi-spatial model. N compartments are filled with producers and free-riders (a compartment can be empty). The system evolves from time t0 to t0ā+āĪt according to the system governed by the Supplementary Equation (S42). We repeatedly āmixedā (multinomial sampling Y-times into the N compartments) the system followed by selection for a time TSā=ā10/α. b For βā<āĻ the system suddenly transitions to the all-C state with increasing number of compartments (decreasing effective neighborhood size). Parameters: αā=ā1, βā=ā2, Ļā=ā3, Īŗā=ā0.5, Ī“Cā=ā0.1, Ī“Dā=ā0.1, Kā=ā1000, C(0)ā=āD(0)ā=ā50, Tsā=ā10. c For βā>āĻ the system transitions to coexistence before equilibrating to the all-C state with increasing number of compartments (decreasing effective neighborhood size). Parameters: αā=ā1, βā=ā5, Ļā=ā2, Īŗā=ā0.5, Ī“Cā=ā0.1, Ī“Dā=ā0.1, Kā=ā1000, C(0)ā=āD(0)ā=ā50, Tsā=ā10. d Calculation of steady state and location of Ncrit for small β. The system transitions directly to the producer-only state. Parameters: αā=ā1, Īŗā=ā0.5, Ī“Cā=ā0.1, Ī“Dā=ā0.1, Kā=ā1000, C(0)ā=āD(0)ā=ā50, Tsā=ā10. e Hysteresis could be observed when changing N without re-initializing the population (parameters are the same as in b). f Predicted Ncrit using mean-field theory compared to the numerically obtained points. Parameters: αā=ā1, Ļā=ā1, Īŗā=ā0.5, Ī“Cā=ā0.1, Ī“Dā=ā0.1, Kā=ā1000, C(0)ā=āD(0)ā=ā50, Tsā=ā10