Fig. 5 | Communications Biology

Fig. 5

From: Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games

Fig. 5

Fluctuations in neighborhood size can stabilize cooperation. a Schematic overview of the quasi-spatial model. N compartments are filled with producers and free-riders (a compartment can be empty). The system evolves from time t0 to t0 + Δt according to the system governed by the Supplementary Equation (S42). We repeatedly ā€œmixedā€ (multinomial sampling Y-times into the N compartments) the system followed by selection for a time TS = 10/α. b For β <ā€‰Ļƒ the system suddenly transitions to the all-C state with increasing number of compartments (decreasing effective neighborhood size). Parameters: α = 1, β = 2, Ļƒā€‰= 3, κ = 0.5, Ī“C = 0.1, Ī“D = 0.1, K = 1000, C(0) = D(0) = 50, Ts = 10. c For β >ā€‰Ļƒ the system transitions to coexistence before equilibrating to the all-C state with increasing number of compartments (decreasing effective neighborhood size). Parameters: α = 1, β = 5, Ļƒā€‰= 2, κ = 0.5, Ī“C = 0.1, Ī“D = 0.1, K = 1000, C(0) = D(0) = 50, Ts = 10. d Calculation of steady state and location of Ncrit for small β. The system transitions directly to the producer-only state. Parameters: α = 1, κ = 0.5, Ī“C = 0.1, Ī“D = 0.1, K = 1000, C(0) = D(0) = 50, Ts = 10. e Hysteresis could be observed when changing N without re-initializing the population (parameters are the same as in b). f Predicted Ncrit using mean-field theory compared to the numerically obtained points. Parameters: α = 1, Ļƒā€‰= 1, κ = 0.5, Ī“C = 0.1, Ī“D = 0.1, K = 1000, C(0) = D(0) = 50, Ts = 10

Back to article page