Fig. 1: The frequency, game payoffs, and the amplitude of fluctuations for different strategies. | Communications Biology

Fig. 1: The frequency, game payoffs, and the amplitude of fluctuations for different strategies.

From: Evolution of cooperation in costly institutions exhibits Red Queen and Black Queen dynamics in heterogeneous public goods

Fig. 1

The frequency (solid blue), game payoffs (dashed red), and amplitude of fluctuations (dotted blue) of costly cooperators (a), costly defectors (b), non-costly cooperators (c), and non-costly defectors (d), as a function of the enhancement factor, r. As r increases, above a first threshold (r* = 1 + cg), cooperation in the costly institution evolves, and above a second threshold (approximately r = 2) cooperation in both the costly and the free institutions evolves. For medium r, the system shows periodic fluctuations. Parameter values: g = 5, nu = 10−3, π0 = 2, cg = 0.398. The replicator dynamic, derived in the Methods Section, is solved for 9000 time steps, and the time averages are taken over the last 2000 time steps.

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