Table 1 Description of the predictors included in each of the models
Ā | Predictors | Reasoning for inclusion |
---|---|---|
Demographics | Age | Demographics have been identified as relevant factors for some climate-relevant outcomes in the literature, albeit with generally small effect sizes2,3. These findings can be useful for selecting groups that should be particularly targeted with communication and intervention strategies. |
Gendera | ||
Education | ||
Political orientation | ||
Income | ||
MacArthur's subjective social status | ||
Psychological antecedents | Trust in climate science/ scientists | As climate risks are not always directly experienced, trusting experts is important to evaluate these risks and act accordingly. Research has shown that trust in climate scientists relates to different types of pro-environmental behaviors64,65. |
Trust in government | Governments have a crucial role in addressing climate change by managing risks, implementing policies, and fairly managing revenues from climate policies, making trust in governments a potentially relevant factor. It has been shown to correlate more strongly with public climate-relevant behaviors than private65. | |
Environmentalist identity | Social identity theory suggests peopleās behavior is shaped by the social groups with which they identify (i.e., environmentalists, humanitarians, or global citizens), and the degree of this identification should relate to both public and private environmental action37,38,39,51. | |
Humanitarian identity | ||
Global citizen identity | ||
Environmental motivation: internal | According to self-determination theory, there are two main types of motivation driving our behavior - intrinsic and extrinsic52 - potentially having differential impacts on peopleās behavior. | |
Environmental motivation: external | ||
Perceived scientific consensus on climate change | The role of perceived scientific consensus has been identified as crucial, and misperceptions of scientific consensus have been associated with reduced levels of support for climate policies66,67. | |
Perceived climate change belief in own country | The perceived belief in climate change of others is a measure of descriptive social norms, identified as crucial for behavior by multiple theories in social psychology (e.g., social identity theory68, value-belief-norm theory69). People underestimate the prevalence of pro-climate views of others70,71, which can be a barrier to climate change mitigation72. | |
Nation level | GINI coefficient | The GINI coefficient is a nation-level measure of income inequality. Inequality has been shown to fuel emission-intensive consumption and production and enable wealthy elites to obstruct climate policies73. |
Human Development Index (HDI) | HDI is a metric of development combining GDP per capita, education levels, and life expectancy. The more economically developed a nation, the less likely they are to show climate change concern50 and to invest part of their income to mitigate climate change4. | |
Climate risk index | There is mixed evidence that personal experience with extreme weather can engage people with climate. Some papers suggest extreme weather events such as floods can increase belief in climate change74 while others say there is no relationship75. | |
Carbon emissions per capita | People from countries relying heavily on fossil fuels are less willing to acknowledge the risk of climate change12, and research has shown an association between climate skepticism and carbon emissions. |