Table 1 Matrix of payoffs for two-strategy games with +/− unilateral payoffs (T > 0 > S)
From: Competitive environments sustain costly altruism with negligible assortment of interactions
Cooperator | Defector | |
|---|---|---|
(a) Conferral of benefit b at net cost c | ||
Cooperator | R = −c + b, | S = −c, |
Ri = R − T + r·b | Si = S + r·b | |
Defector | T = b, | P, |
Ti = 0 | P i | |
(b) Manufacture of public good b at net cost c − b > 0 | ||
Cooperator | R = −c/2 + b, | S = –(c – b), |
Ri = R – T + r·b | Si = S + r·b | |
Defector | T = b, | P, |
Ti = 0 | P i | |
