Table 4 The expected payoff π1(θ1,t, θ2,t) of player 1 when the realized actions of player 1 and 2 are θ1,t and θ2,t, respectively
θ1,t | θ2,t | π1(θ1,t, θ2,t) |
|---|---|---|
CA | CA | 1/2 − q |
CA | CN | 1 − (1/2)(1 − d)2 − q |
CN | CA | (1/2)(1 − d)2 |
CN | CN | 1/2 |
C* | SA | 1 − d |
C* | SN | 1 |
SA | C* | d − q |
SN | C* | 0 |
S* | S* | 1/2 |
