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Showing 1–22 of 22 results
Advanced filters: Author: Christian Hilbe Clear advanced filters

  • Theory predicts that extortioners, individuals that obtain advantages through forces and threats, can outperform any generous co-player. Here, Hilbe et al.show experimentally that humans punish extortion by refusing to cooperate, which reduces the extortioner’s gains, and suggest that generosity is more profitable in the long run.

    • Christian Hilbe
    • Torsten Röhl
    • Manfred Milinski
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 5, P: 1-6

  • Rossetti and coauthors explore how human cooperation dynamics shift when players engage in multiple economic games at the same time, rather than treating each game as isolated. The authors find that cognitive constraints, strategic motives, and spillover effects can reduce cooperation in such scenarios, challenging traditional models of direct reciprocity.

    • Charlotte S. L. Rossetti
    • Oliver P. Hauser
    • Christian Hilbe
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 16, P: 1-11

  • Nowak and colleagues present a game theoretic model that explains how behaviours like subtlety, modesty and anonymous good deeds can be maintained under the standard model of reputation building and indirect reciprocity.

    • Moshe Hoffman
    • Christian Hilbe
    • Martin A. Nowak
    Research
    Nature Human Behaviour
    Volume: 2, P: 397-404

  • A strategy for cooperation in repeated games, called cumulative reciprocity, is proposed. This strategy is robust with respect to errors, enforces fair outcomes, and evolves in environments that are usually hostile to cooperation.

    • Juan Li
    • Xiaowei Zhao
    • Haoxiang Xia
    Research
    Nature Computational Science
    Volume: 2, P: 677-686

  • In stochastic games, there is a feedback loop between a group’s social behaviors and its environment. Kleshnina et al. show that groups are often more cooperative when they know the exact state of their environment, although there are also intriguing cases when ignorance is beneficial.

    • Maria Kleshnina
    • Christian Hilbe
    • Martin A. Nowak
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 14, P: 1-11

  • Hilbe et al. synthesize recent theoretical work on zero-determinant and ‘rival’ versus ‘partner’ strategies in social dilemmas. They describe the environments under which these contrasting selfish or cooperative strategies emerge in evolution.

    • Christian Hilbe
    • Krishnendu Chatterjee
    • Martin A. Nowak
    Reviews
    Nature Human Behaviour
    Volume: 2, P: 469-477

  • A framework that includes inequality shows that extreme inequality prevents cooperation, but overall welfare is maximized when endowments and productivities are aligned such that more-productive individuals receive higher endowments.

    • Oliver P. Hauser
    • Christian Hilbe
    • Martin A. Nowak
    Research
    Nature
    Volume: 572, P: 524-527

  • In many instances of reciprocity, individuals cooperate in turns. Here, the authors analyze the equilibria and the dynamics of such alternating games, and in particular describe all strategies with one-round memory that maintain cooperation.

    • Peter S. Park
    • Martin A. Nowak
    • Christian Hilbe
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 13, P: 1-11

  • Schmid et al. present a unified framework for direct and indirect reciprocity, exploring how people choose to cooperate on the basis of either their direct experience with others (direct reciprocity) or the others’ general reputation (indirect reciprocity).

    • Laura Schmid
    • Krishnendu Chatterjee
    • Martin A. Nowak
    Research
    Nature Human Behaviour
    Volume: 5, P: 1292-1302

  • Most evolutionary game theory focuses on isolated games. Here, Donahue et al. present a general framework for ‘multichannel games’ in which individuals engage in a set of parallel games with a partner, and show that such parallel interactions favor the evolution of reciprocity across games.

    • Kate Donahue
    • Oliver P. Hauser
    • Christian Hilbe
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 11, P: 1-9

  • Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies.

    • Manfred Milinski
    • Christian Hilbe
    • Jochem Marotzke
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 7, P: 1-9

  • Dietary lipids are linked to the development of inflammatory bowel diseases through unclear mechanisms. Here, the authors report that dietary polyunsaturated fatty acids trigger intestinal inflammation resembling aspects of Crohn’s disease, which is restricted by glutathione peroxidase 4 in the intestinal epithelium.

    • Lisa Mayr
    • Felix Grabherr
    • Timon E. Adolph
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 11, P: 1-15

  • Indirect reciprocity describes how cooperation arises in a community when its members value their reputation. Here, the authors show that nuanced assessments of observations can mitigate disagreements and errors when the opinions of community members are not synchronized.

    • Laura Schmid
    • Farbod Ekbatani
    • Krishnendu Chatterjee
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 14, P: 1-14

  • Rewards can motivate people to cooperate, but the evolution of rewarding behavior is itself poorly understood. Here, a game-theoretic analysis shows that reputation effects facilitate the simultaneous evolution of cooperation and social rewarding policies.

    • Saptarshi Pal
    • Christian Hilbe
    ResearchOpen Access
    Nature Communications
    Volume: 13, P: 1-11

  • Cooperation is more likely to evolve in a public-goods-distribution game when payoffs can change between rounds so that the stakes increase when players cooperate and decrease when players defect.

    • Christian Hilbe
    • Štěpán Šimsa
    • Martin A. Nowak
    Research
    Nature
    Volume: 559, P: 246-249