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Sociology (communication arising (reply))

The puzzle of human cooperation

Nature volume 421, page 912 (2003)Cite this article

Abstract

The claim by Johnson et al. that human cooperation in social-dilemma games violates rational-choice theory is not justified1. If people have altruistic aims, altruistic behaviour is a rational means by which to achieve their proximate goals. From an evolutionary viewpoint, we need to explain why humans are often altruistic by strong reciprocity2,3,4. Although kin selection, reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity explain relevant forms of human cooperation5,6,7, they do not ultimately explain strong reciprocity8.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Zürich, 8006, Switzerland

    Ernst Fehr

  2. University of St Gallen, St Gallen, FEW-HSG, 9000, Switzerland

    Simon Gächter

Authors
  1. Ernst Fehr
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  2. Simon Gächter
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Correspondence to Ernst Fehr.

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Fehr, E., Gächter, S. The puzzle of human cooperation. Nature 421, 912 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1038/421912a

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