Table 2 Comparative analysis of various existing authentication schemes.
Ref | Type | Problem addressed | Encryption method | Assumption | Resistance to attacks | Benefits | Limitations | Application |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pseudonym based CPPA | ESL | PUF, ECC | DLP, CDHP | Cloning, physical, impersonation, MiTM, relay, known session key and ESL attacks | Ensures Mutual authentication, key agreement, conditional privacy | 1.Computational cost soars high 2.Temporal Secret leakage persists | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Coalition, Public Key replacement, forgery attacks | ECC | DLP | Forgery, tampering, collusion and malicious KGC attacks | Ensures message integrity, authentication, anonymity, traceability, Conditional identity privacy, unlinkability | Computational Overhead is still high | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Centralized trusted authority, Single-point-of-failure and Service unavailability | ECC | DLP | Replay attack, Privileged Insider or Stolen verifier table attack, ESL attack and Key escrowness | Ensures anonymity, untraceability, conditional privacy, mutual authentication, Forward/Backward secrecy | 1.Computation cost incurred by the parent TA is high 2.Session key attacks weakens the security 3.The stored data can be easily hacked by the TA and perform leakage | Fog-enabled VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Security, Privacy, Key Escrow Problem | ECC | DLP | Modification, Forgery, Replay and MiTM attacks | Ensures message authentication, Dynamic pseudonym, unlinkability, conditional traceability, forward and backward secrecy | 1.Computational cost is high 2.Pseudonym updation is an additional overhead incurred | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Forward Secrecy, | HSM | CDHP, BDHE | Replay, Session Key attacks | Ensures identity privacy, traceability, authentication, untraceability | Incurs high communication overhead | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Linkage attack due to pseudonyms | Bilinear Pairing | k-CAA | - | Ensures anonymity, unlinkability, non-repudiation, message integrity, traceability and revocation | 1. Suited only for V2V communications 2. Suffers from central tendency | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Authentication Delay, DoS, Central tendency, Compatability | ECC, Secret Sharing Scheme | Generic | Tampering, Spoofing and DoS attacks | Ensures conditional privacy, repudiation, tampering, information disclosure, Elevation of privilege | Authentication Delay is still very high | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Authentication Delay, Computational Overhead | ECC, (2,n) Threshold Scheme | Collision Resistant, In distinguishability in Cipher-Text | ESL, replay, impersonation, RSU compromise, Malev olent Vehicle User, privileged insider/Stolen Smart Card Attacks | Ensures typo detection, privacy, mutual authentication, forward/backward secrecy | Communication cost is very high | NextGenV2V | |
Pseudonym based CPPA | Certificate Management Overhead | ECC, Cuckoo Filter, (MHT) | Merkle Hash Tree | MiTM, Impersonation and replay attacks | Ensure mutual authentication, identity anonymity, | Does not support V2I communications | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Computation & Communication Overhead | Elliptic Curves and Ring Signatures, Aggregation | CDHP, DDHP, sqCDHP, divCDHP | Impersonation, Signature forgery attacks | Ensures traceability, conditional privacy, message authentication, unforgeability, anonymity and efficiency | 1.Computational overhead incurred by the TTA is very high 2.Non-Repudiation cannot be achieved | VANETs | |
Pseudonym based CPPA | Large verification delays & high communication Overhead | Bilinear Pairing, Aggregation | CDHP | Replay attack | Ensures message authentication, integrity, Non-Repudiation, anonymity, unlinkability, Traceability | Computational cost is high due to pairing operation | VANETs | |
Pseudonym based CPPA | Security, unlinkability & Anonymity | Bilinear Pairing, Batch Authentication | DLP, CDHP | Replay, impersonation, message modification attacks | Ensures message authentication, unlinkability, traceability, anonymity, Revocation | Tested & validation for real-time implementations | VANETs | |
Identity based CPPA | Forward & Backward Secrecy | Bilinear Maps, Puncturable Authentication, Parallel Key Insulation | CDHP, eCDHP | Chosen-Message Attacks | Ensures anonymity, mutual authentication, conditional privacy, unlinkability, forward secrecy, backward secrecy | Authentication Delay is very high | IoVs | |
Identity based GKA | Security | ECC | CDHP, DLP | Chosen Cipher text, known plaintext, chosen plaintext, key, MiTM, Brute force, device capture, stolen verifier, | Ensures group authentication, message integrity | Has to be validated using real-time implementations | IIoTs | |
Pseudonym based CPPA | Cross-domain dynamic group session key negotiation and high Computational overhead | ECC | DLP, CDHP | Replay, impersonation and tampering attacks | Ensures mutual authentication, fog node anonymity, vehicle anonymity, fog node traceability, vehicle traceability, Session key establishment, Cross-domain authenticated key agreement, Traffic condition matching, forward secrecy | Updation of session key invokes high communication overhead | Fog-cloud Based VANETs | |
MAC based GKA | Security, privacy | MAC, ECC, Shamir’s (k,n) threshold secret sharing | - | Replay, forgery and message modification attacks | Ensures message authentication, privacy preservation, conditional privacy, unlinkability | Suited only for V2V communications | VANETs | |
Identity based GKA | Computational Cost | Password, Hash function, Group Key | – | Replay, Impersonation, message modification, offline-password guessing attacks | Ensures conditional privacy, traceability, message authentication, group-key agreement, backward secrecy, forward secrecy | Authentication delay persists | VANETs | |
Identity based GKA | Signature, Certificate forgery, | Bilinear Maps | ECDLP, DBDHP | Replay, forgery MiTM | Ensures group key agreement, mutual authentication, anonymity, traceability, forward secrecy, backward secrecy | High communication Overhead | C-V2X | |
Identity based GKS | Data Breach | Multiparty Group Key, Hash algorithm, Threshold Modulo | – | KSSTI attack, impersonation, known key, replay, de-synchronization, message modification, DoS attacks | Achieves unlinkability, mutual authentication, traceability and dynamic session specific modulus, conditional privacy | Communication overhead still persists | VANETs | |
Pseudonym based GKA | Data Breach | Dynamic Key Rotation, treeKEM, Threshold secret sharing scheme, Pseudo-random function, Pseudo-random permutation | – | Collusion, | Achieves Conditional privacy, confidentiality, unlinkability, PCFS, | Communication cost has to get reduced | IoVs | |
Identity based GKA | Security, Privacy | Chaotic Map, Chebyshev polynomial | DLP, DHP | Replay, Insider attacks | Achieves group authentication, deniability, privacy preservation and forward secrecy | 1.Susceptible to Bergamo et al.22 attacks 2. Communication cost is high | VANETs | |
Identity based GKA | Security, privacy, Computation & Communication Overhead | Chaotic Map, Chebyshev polynomial | eCDLP | Known key, replay, impersonation, MiTM | Achieves mutual authentication, session key security, key agreement, data integrity, perfect forward secrecy, | 1.Cannot resist insider attacks 2.Suffers from Bergamo et al. 22 attack | Networks | |
Identity based GKA | Security, privacy, Computation & Communication Overhead | Chaotic Map, Chebyshev polynomial | CDHP | Replay, Modification | Achieves group authentication, conditional privacy, location privacy, traceability, forward and backward secrecy | Suffers from Bergamo et al. 22 attack | VANETs |
