Table 1 Summary of existing literature on evolutionary game theory in carbon trading mechanisms.

The Application of Evolutionary Game Models in Carbon Market Research

Economic Effects of Government Regulation

Jiao et al.⁴ models the evolution of strategies between local governments and enterprises, revealing how reward and punishment mechanisms can enhance carbon reduction efficiency

Zhang et al.⁵ develops an evolutionary game model to explore the dynamic decision-making of enterprises under carbon market regulations and the role of government enforcement in ensuring compliance

Some researches highlight the dynamics of government-enterprise cooperation and competition in carbon markets, analyzing the role of penalties and subsidies through evolutionary game theory and SD models^6,7

Gao et al.⁸‘s research models evolutionary games between stakeholders to design carbon sequestration compensation mechanisms for national parks within a carbon trading context

Dong et al.⁹ explores how to elucidate the governance efficiency of carbon trading markets in achieving emission reduction goals using the DID model

Influence of Green Consumption

Guo et al.¹⁰ explores the interactions between government policies and household carbon reduction behaviors in consumer-focused carbon trading markets using evolutionary game theory

Synergy Between Green Production and Green Consumption

Wang and Cheng¹¹ applies evolutionary game theory to examine how carbon trading influences operational decisions within supply chains, particularly in terms of emission reduction investments

Carbon Trading Market Mechanism Design

Carbon Quota Allocation and Market Liquidity

Ma and Wang¹²‘s article uses the DCC-MVGARCH model, revealed a strong correlation between China’s carbon trading and energy markets, but a negative correlation with the capital market, highlighting inefficiencies in China’s carbon quota allocation

Liu P D, et al.¹³ focuses on how carbon quota trading affects competition and collaboration among enterprises, using evolutionary game theory to analyze stable strategies

Liu Y, et al.¹⁴ uses the super efficiency SBM model and a multi-phase DID model toanalyze how carbon trading policies influence the green total factor productivity of high-carbon industries. And concludes that improvement of the carbon quota allocation system, improve the information disclosure system of the carbon trading market is necessary

Li B, et al. ¹⁵ discusses how evolutionary game models can optimize coordination mechanisms to enhance the carbon reduction effects of quota trading

Price Volatility and Market Stability

Li Y M, et al.¹⁴ uses evolutionary game models to investigate how dynamic carbon pricing affects the investment strategies of governments and enterprises in renewable energy projects

Ding and Cao¹⁶ uses the GTAP-E model, analyzed the EU’s carbon tariffs and found that China’s domestic carbon market can mitigate “carbon leakage” more effectively than accepting “carbon tariffs.”

Yin and Li¹⁷ uses the input–output model and Monte Carlo simulation o evaluate the strategic responses of Chinese enterprises to the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism and puts forward a series of policy recommendations to resolve the adverse impact of CBAM

Factors Affecting Carbon Trading Market Stability

Li L X, et al.¹⁸ examined the evolutionary game of carbon pricing in the context of renewable energy investment and low-carbon technology innovation

Liu Y, et al.¹⁹ investigates how carbon trading mechanisms stimulate urban-level green technology advancements using an evolutionary game approach

Xu and Liu²⁰ employs a difference-in-differences model, incorporating the spatial effects of energy consumption, to examine the impacts of energy consumption structure optimization, total energy control, and carbon trading pilot policies on regional low-carbon economic transitions