Table 3 Payoff matrix of the model.

From: Stability analysis of carbon emission trading mechanism in China based on a tripartite evolutionary game

Governments

Enterprises

Consumers

 

Existence of low-carbon preferences (z)

Have no special preference actions (1-z)

Set a low-carbon policy

(x)

Actively reduce carbon emission

(y)

θ·Rg-Cg + M + T·Pc·Q2-S

θ·Rg-Cg + T·Pc·Q2-S

Rc-Cd + Cr-Ir-T·Pc·Q2 + S + U + Pc·Q3

Rw-Cd + Cr-Ir-T·Pc·Q2 + S + U + Pc·Q3

L1-Rc

L2-Rw

Maintain original actions

(1-y)

θ·Rg-Cg + M + T·Pc·Q1 + K

θ·Rg-Cg + T·Pc·Q1 + K

Rw-Cd-Pc·Q3-T·Pc·Q1-K

Rw-Cd-Pc·Q3-T·Pc·Q1-K

L2-Rw

L2-Rw

No implement a specific policy

(1-x)

Actively reduce carbon emission

(y)

Rg-Cw

Rg-Cw

Rc-Cd + Cr-Ir + U + Pc·Q3

Rw-Cd + Cr-Ir + Pc·Q3

L1-Rc

L2-Rw

Maintain original actions

(1-y)

Rg-Cw

Rg-Cw

Rw-Cd-Pc·Q3

Rw-Cd-Pc·Q3

L2-Rw

L2-Rw