Table 2 Negative binomial regressions predicting the scale of OFDI under BRI.
From: CEO political connections and OFDI of Chinese firms under the Belt and Road Initiative
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GDP per capita | −0.0444* | −0.0434* | −0.0429* | 0.0447 | 0.0495 |
(0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.031) | (0.030) | |
GDP growth | 0.0105** | 0.0108** | 0.0106** | 0.0038 | 0.0032 |
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Gini coefficient | 0.3320** | 0.3235** | 0.2928** | 0.4045*** | 0.3723*** |
(0.142) | (0.143) | (0.141) | (0.146) | (0.144) | |
Population density | −0.0254* | −0.0237* | −0.0228 | 0.0484** | 0.0528*** |
(0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.019) | (0.019) | |
CPI | −0.1237** | −0.1228** | −0.1201** | −0.1128** | −0.1095** |
(0.052) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.050) | (0.050) | |
Size | 0.0506*** | 0.0492*** | 0.0474*** | 0.0496*** | 0.0479*** |
(0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) | |
Adjusted ROA | 0.2524 | 0.2394 | 0.2771 | 0.2192 | 0.2584 |
(0.177) | (0.176) | (0.177) | (0.173) | (0.175) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.0216 | 0.0253 | 0.0232 | 0.0268 | 0.0244 |
(0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) | |
Book-to-market ratio | −0.1423 | −0.1285 | −0.1189 | −0.1336 | −0.1243 |
(0.128) | (0.137) | (0.136) | (0.134) | (0.134) | |
Net profit growth | −0.0014 | −0.0013 | −0.0013 | −0.0015 | −0.0015 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Patent stock | −0.0393*** | −0.0413*** | −0.0407*** | −0.0404*** | −0.0398*** |
(0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
Concentration | 0.0004 | 0.0004 | 0.0004 | 0.0003 | 0.0003 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Separation ratio | 0.0012 | 0.0009 | 0.0005 | 0.0007 | 0.0002 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
R&D employee ratio | −0.0017** | −0.0019** | −0.0019** | −0.0021** | −0.0021** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Marketization | 0.0824*** | 0.0824*** | 0.1855*** | 0.0827*** | 0.1926*** |
(0.025) | (0.025) | (0.046) | (0.026) | (0.047) | |
WGI | 0.1147*** | 0.1101** | 0.1039** | 0.1058*** | 0.1067*** |
(0.043) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.068) | (0.066) | |
Politics | 0.0820** | 0.0948*** | 0.0944** | 0.1115*** | |
(0.036) | (0.037) | (0.042) | (0.043) | ||
Politics × Marketization | −0.1311*** | −0.1395*** | |||
(0.043) | (0.043) | ||||
Politics × WGI | −0.1465*** | −0.1637*** | |||
(0.040) | (0.039) | ||||
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
(constant) | −1.9130** | −1.8881** | −1.0620*** | −1.2021*** | −1.5552*** |
(0.829) | (0.819) | (0.983) | (1.050) | (1.187) | |
N | 3226 | 3216 | 3216 | 3216 | 3216 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0237 | 0.0241 | 0.0251 | 0.0253 | 0.0264 |
Log pseudolikelihood | −3883.2646 | −3869.524 | −3865.6107 | −3864.6642 | −3860.2555 |
