Table 3 Using one-year lag independent variable to run models as a robustness check.
From: CEO political connections and OFDI of Chinese firms under the Belt and Road Initiative
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GDP per capita | −0.0444* | −0.0407 | −0.0402 | 0.0474 | 0.0511* |
(0.025) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.031) | (0.031) | |
GDP growth | 0.0105** | 0.0105** | 0.0105** | 0.0038 | 0.0035 |
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Gini coefficient | 0.3320** | 0.3117** | 0.2961** | 0.3968*** | 0.3798*** |
(0.142) | (0.145) | (0.144) | (0.149) | (0.147) | |
Population density | −0.0254* | −0.0215 | −0.0209 | 0.0501** | 0.0533*** |
(0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.020) | (0.020) | |
CPI | −0.1237** | −0.1195** | −0.1172** | −0.1077** | −0.1049** |
(0.052) | (0.053) | (0.052) | (0.051) | (0.051) | |
Size | 0.0506*** | 0.0476*** | 0.0467*** | 0.0479*** | 0.0470*** |
(0.012) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | |
Adjusted ROA | 0.2524 | 0.2662 | 0.2753 | 0.2432 | 0.2531 |
(0.177) | (0.180) | (0.182) | (0.178) | (0.180) | |
Tobin’s Q | 0.0216 | 0.0255 | 0.0249 | 0.0273 | 0.0267 |
(0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) | |
Book-to-market ratio | −0.1423 | −0.1200 | −0.1132 | −0.1228 | −0.1155 |
(0.128) | (0.137) | (0.137) | (0.135) | (0.135) | |
Net profit growth | −0.0014 | −0.0013 | −0.0013 | −0.0015 | −0.0015 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Patent stock | −0.0393*** | −0.0418*** | −0.0420*** | −0.0410*** | −0.0412*** |
(0.006) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
Concentration | 0.0004 | 0.0006 | 0.0006 | 0.0005 | 0.0005 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Separation ratio | 0.0012 | 0.0011 | 0.0009 | 0.0009 | 0.0006 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | |
R&D employee ratio | −0.0017** | −0.0019** | −0.0019** | −0.0020** | −0.0021** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | |
Marketization | 0.0824*** | 0.0807*** | 0.1459*** | 0.0809*** | 0.1523*** |
(0.025) | (0.026) | (0.045) | (0.026) | (0.045) | |
WGI | 0.1147*** | 0.1074** | 0.1035** | 0.0602*** | 0.0921*** |
(0.043) | (0.044) | (0.044) | (2.328) | (2.336) | |
Politics | 0.0875*** | 0.0962*** | 0.0954*** | 0.1075*** | |
(0.033) | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.038) | ||
Politics × Marketization | −0.0827** | −0.0903** | |||
(0.042) | (0.042) | ||||
Politics × WGI | −0.1716*** | −0.1947*** | |||
(0.088) | (0.094) | ||||
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
(constant) | −1.9130** | −1.8654** | −2.6312*** | −1.1872*** | −1.0970*** |
(0.829) | (0.843) | (0.988) | (1.079) | (1.202) | |
N | 3226 | 3114 | 3114 | 3114 | 3114 |
Pseudo R2 | 0.0237 | 0.0245 | 0.0249 | 0.0257 | 0.0262 |
Log pseudolikelihood | −3883.2646 | −3750.9378 | −3749.3697 | −3746.3528 | −3744.493 |
