Abstract
Resource allocation takes place in various types of real-world complex systems such as urban traffic, social services institutions, economical and ecosystems. Mathematically, the dynamical process of resource allocation can be modeled as minority games. Spontaneous evolution of the resource allocation dynamics, however, often leads to a harmful herding behavior accompanied by strong fluctuations in which a large majority of agents crowd temporarily for a few resources, leaving many others unused. Developing effective control methods to suppress and eliminate herding is an important but open problem. Here we develop a pinning control method, that the fluctuations of the system consist of intrinsic and systematic components allows us to design a control scheme with separated control variables. A striking finding is the universal existence of an optimal pinning fraction to minimize the variance of the system, regardless of the pinning patterns and the network topology. We carry out a generally applicable theory to explain the emergence of optimal pinning and to predict the dependence of the optimal pinning fraction on the network topology. Our work represents a general framework to deal with the broader problem of controlling collective dynamics in complex systems with potential applications in social, economical and political systems.
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Introduction
Resource allocation is an essential process in many real-world systems such as ecosystems of various sizes, transportation systems (e.g., Internet, urban traffic grids, rail and flight networks), public service providers (e.g., marts, hospitals and schools) and social and economic organizations (e.g., banks and financial markets). The underlying system that supports resource allocation often contains a large number of interacting components or agents on a hierarchy of scales and there are multiple resources available for each agent. As a result, complex behaviors are expected to emerge ubiquitously in the dynamical evolution of resource allocation. In particular, in a typical situation, agents or individuals possess similar capabilities in information processing and decision making and they share the common goal of pursuing as high payoffs as possible. The interactions among the agents and their desire to maximize payoffs in competing for limited resources can lead to vast complexity in the system dynamics.
Given resource-allocation system that exhibits complex dynamics, a defining virtue of optimal performance is that the available resources are exploited evenly or uniformly by all agents in the system. In contrast, an undesired or even catastrophic behavior is the emergence of herding, in which a vast majority of agents concentrate on a few resources, leaving many other resources idle or unused1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12. Herd behavior has also attracted much attention in traditional economics13,14,15,16. If this behavior is not controlled, the few focused resources would be depleted, possibly directing agents to a different but still small set of resources. From a systems point of view, this can lead to a cascading type of failures as resources are being depleted one after another, eventually resulting in a catastrophic breakdown of the system on a global scale. In this paper, we analyze and test an effective method to control herding dynamics in complex resource-allocation systems.
A universal paradigm to model and understand the interactions and dynamical evolutions in many real world systems is complex adaptive systems17,18,19, among which minority game (MG)20,21 stands out as a particularly pertinent framework for resource allocation. MG dynamics was introduced by Challet and Zhang to address the classic El Farol bar-attendance problem conceived by Arthur22. In an MG system, each agent makes choice (e.g., + or −, to attend a bar or to stay at home) based on available global information from the previous round of interaction. The agents who pick the minority resource are rewarded and those belonging to the majority group are punished due to limited resources. The MG dynamics has been studied extensively in the past21,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40.
To analyze, understand and exploit the MG dynamics, there are two theoretical approaches: mean field approximation and Boolean dynamics. The mean field approach was mainly developed by researchers from the statistical-physics community to cast the MG problem in the general framework of non-equilibrium phase transitions21,20,41,42. In the Boolean dynamics, for any agent, detailed information about the other agents that it interacts with is assumed to be available and the agent responds accordingly1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12. Both approaches can lead to “better than random” performance in resource utilization. However, herding behavior in which many agents take identical action43 can also take place, which has been extensively studied and recognized as one important factor contributing to the origin of complexity that leads to enhanced fluctuations and, consequently, to significant degradation in efficiency1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12.
The control scheme we analyze in this paper is the pinning method that has been studied in controlling the collective dynamics, such as synchronization, in complex networks11,44,45,46,47,48,49,50. For the general setting of pinning control, the two key parameters are the “pinning fraction,” the fraction of agents chosen to hold a fixed state and the “pinning pattern,” the configuration of plus or minus state assigned to the pinned agents. Our previous work11 treated the special case of two resources of identical capacities, where the pinning pattern was such that the probabilities of agents pinned to positive or negative state (to be defined later) are equal. Note that, while the pinned agents are frozen during system’s dynamical evolution, they are different from the “quenched” behavior in MG23. Especially, in our case the pinned states are a controlled state by design, but in typical MG dynamics the quenched behaviors are an emergent state through self organization. Here, we investigate a more realistic model setting and articulate a general mathematic control framework. A striking finding is that biased pinning control pattern can lead to an optimal pinning fraction for a variety of network topologies, so that the system efficiency can be improved remarkably. We develop a theoretical analysis based on the mean-field approximation to understand the non-monotonic behavior of the system efficiency about the optimal pinning fraction. We also study the dependence of the optimal fraction on the topological features of the system, such as the average degree and heterogeneity and obtain a theoretical upper bound of the system efficiency. The theoretical predictions are validated with extensive numerical simulations. Our work represents a general framework to optimally control the collective dynamics in complex MG systems with potential applications in social, economical and political systems.
Results
Boolean dynamics
In the original Boolean system, a population of N agents compete for two alternative resources, denoted as r = + and r = −, which have the same accommodating capacity . Similar to the MG dynamics, only the agents belonging to the global minority group are rewarded by one unit of payoff. As a result, the profit of the system is equal to the number of agents selecting the resource with attendance less than the accommodating capacity, which constitute the global-minority group. The dynamical variable of the Boolean system is denoted as
, the number of + agents in the system at time step t. The variance of
about the capacity
characterizes the efficiency of the system. The densities of the + and − agents in the whole system are
and
, respectively. The state of the system can be conveniently specified by the column vector
.
A Boolean system has two states (a binary state system), in which agents make decision according to the local information from immediate neighbors. The neighborhood of an agent is determined by the connecting structure of the underlying network. Each agent receives inputs from its neighboring agents and updates its state according to the Boolean function, a function that generates either + and − from the inputs3. Realistically, for any agent, global information about the minority choice from all other agents at the preceding time step may not be available. Under this circumstance, the agent attempts to decide the global minority choice based on neighbors’ previous states. To be concrete, we assume4,11 that agent i with neighbors chooses + at time step t + 1 with the probability

and chooses − with the probability , where
and
, respectively, are the numbers of + and − neighbors of i at time step t, with
. The expressions of probabilities, however, are valid only under the assumption that the two resources have the same accommodating capacity, i.e.,
. In real-world resource allocation systems, typically we have
. Consider, for example, the extreme case of
. Suppose we have
for agent i. In this case, rationality demands a stronger preference to the resource + (i.e., with a higher probability). To investigate the issues associated with the control of realistic Boolean dynamics, we define

where is the response function of each agent to its local environment
, i.e., the local neighbor’s configuration with
and
. The quantity
(or
characterizes the contribution of the
-neighbors (or r-neighbors) to the probability for i to adopt r. The quantity
represents the strength of assimilation effect among the neighbors, while
quantifies the dissimilation effect. Intuitively, the resource with a larger accommodating capacity would have a stronger assimilation effect among agents. By definition, the elements in each column in the matrix
satisfy
, i.e., the total probability for an agent to choose + and − is unity.
Using the mean-field assumption that the configuration of neighbors is uniform over the whole system, i.e., , we have that the stable solution for Eq. (2) satisfies
, which leads to the eigenstate of
as

The rational response of agents to nonidentical accommodation capacities of resources will lead to the equality
, i.e., the stable fraction of the agent densities in + and − is simply the ratio of the capacities. The elements of
can then be defined accordingly using this ratio and the condition
, which characterizes a stronger preference to the resource with a larger capacity. For the specific case of identical-capacity resources, we have
and the solution reduces to the result
of the original Boolean dynamics4,11. The optimal solution for the resource allocation is
.
A general measure of Boolean system’s performance is the variance of with respect to the capacity
:

which characterizes, over a time interval , the statistical deviations from the optimal resource utilization4. A smaller value of σ2 indicates that the resource allocation is more optimal. A general phenomenon associated with Boolean dynamics is that, as agents strive to join the minority group, an undesired herding behavior can emerge, as characterized by large oscillations in
. Our goal is to understand, for the general setting of nonidentical resource capacities, the effect of pinning control on suppressing/eliminating the herding behavior.
Pinning control scheme
Following the general principle of pinning control of complex dynamical networks11,44,45,46,47,48,49,50, we set out to control the herding behavior by “pinning” a few agents to freeze their states during the dynamical evolution so as to realize optimal resource allocation for the entire network. Let be the fraction of agents to be pinned, so the fraction of unpinned (or free) nodes is
. The numbers of the two different types of agents, respectively, are
and
. The free agents make choices according to local time-dependent information, for whom the inputs from the pinned agents are fixed.
The two basic quantities characterizing a pinning control scheme are the order of pinning (the way how certain agents are chosen to be pinned) and the pinning pattern11. We adopt the degree-preferential pinning (DPP) in which the agents are selected to be pinned according to their connectivity or degrees in the underlying network. In particular, agents of higher degrees are more likely to be pinned. This pinning method originated from the classic control method to mitigate the effects of intentional attacks in complex networks51,52,53. The selection of the pinning pattern can be characterized by the fractions and
of the pinned agents that select
and
, respectively, where
. The quantities
and
are thus the pinning pattern indicators. Different from the previous work11 that investigated the specific case of
(half-half pinning pattern), here we consider the more general case where
is treated as a variable. The pinning schemes are implemented on random networks and scale-free networks with different values of the scaling exponent γ in the power-law degree distribution54,55
. As we will see below, one uniform optimal pinning fraction
exists for various values of the pinning pattern indicator
.
Simulation Results
To gain insight, we first study the original Boolean dynamics with and
for different values of the pinning pattern indicator
. The game dynamics are implemented on scale-free networks of size
and of the scaling exponent
54 with the average degree
ranging from 6 to 40. The DPP scheme is performed with pinning fraction
and
values ranging from 0.6 to 1.0 (i.e., all to + pinning). The variance
versus
for different values of
and different degree
are shown in Fig. 1. We see that, in general, systems with larger values of
exhibit larger variance, implying that a larger deviation of
from the ratio of the capacity
can lead to lower efficiency in resource allocation. Surprisingly, there exists a universal optimal pinning fraction (denoted by
about 0.4, where the variance
is minimized and exhibits an opposite trend for
, i.e., larger values of
result in smaller values of σ2. The implication is that, deviations of
from
provide an opportunity to achieve better performance (with smaller variances σ2), due to the non-monotonic behavior of σ2 with
. To understand the emergence of the optimal pinning fraction
, we see from Fig. 1 that the values of
are approximately identical for different values of
, which decrease with the average degree
. As we will see below, in the large degree limit
, the value of σ2 can be predicted theoretically (c.f. Fig. 4).
Variance σ2 as a function of the pinning fraction ρp for scale-free networks of different connection densities.
The average degree of the networks for simulation are , 10, 14, to 40 in (a–d), respectively and the value of the pinning pattern indicator
ranges from 0.6 to 1.0 for each panel. The results are averaged over 200 realizations for scale-free networks of size
and degree exponent
. In each realization, the system evolves for 10000 time steps and
is calculated from the corresponding
, with the first 3000 time steps discarded to avoid the influence of transient state.
Theoretical prediction of the variance σ2 in comparison with the simulation results.
The system has size and power-law degree distribution
with scaling exponent
. The theoretical prediction does not depend on the value of the average degree. In direct simulations, the values of the average degree are
, 10, 14 and 40. The simulation results denoted by symbols are the same as those plotted in Fig. 1, with the pinning pattern indicator to be
.
Simulations using scale-free networks of different degrees of heterogeneity also indicate the existence of the universal optimal pinning control scheme, as can be seen from the behaviors of the variance calculated from scale-free networks of different degree exponents (Fig. 2)55, where smaller values of γ point to a stronger degree of heterogeneity of the system. We see that an optimal value of exists for all cases, which decreases only slightly with γ, i.e., more heterogeneous networks exhibit larger values of the optimal pinning fraction
, a phenomenon that can also be predicated theoretically (c.f. Fig. 5).
Variance σ2 as a function of the pinning fraction ρp for scale-free networks of varying degrees of heterogeneity.
The scaling exponents of the networks are , 2.5, 2.7 and 3.0 in (a–d), respectively and the value of the pinning pattern indicator
ranges from 0.6 to 1.0 for each panel. The results are averaged over 200 realizations for scale-free networks of size
and average degree
. In each realization, the system evolves for 10000 time steps and
is calculated from the corresponding
, with the first 3000 time steps discarded to avoid the influence of transient state.
Theoretical prediction of variance σ2 for systems with different degree scaling exponents.
The system has size and power-law degree distribution
with different values of the degree exponent: (a–d)
, 2.5, 2.7, 3.0, respectively. In each case, the value of the pinning pattern indicator
ranges from 0.6 to 1.0.
Theoretical Analysis
The phenomenon of the existence of a universal optimal pinning fraction , independent of the specific values of pinning pattern indicator
, is remarkable. Here we develop a quantitative theory to explain this phenomenon.
To begin, we note that MG is effectively a stochastic dynamical process due to the randomness in the selection of states by the agents. The variance of the system, a measure of the efficiency of the system, is determined by two separated factors. The first, denoted as , is the intrinsic fluctuations of A about its expected value
, defined as
, which can be calculated once the stable distribution of attendance
is known, where
can be obtained either analytically (c.f., Fig. 3) or numerically. The second factor, denoted as
, is the difference of the expected value
from the capacity
of the system:
, which also contributes to the variance of the system. Taking into account the two factors, we can write the system variance σ2 [defined in Eq. (4)] as
Theoretical prediction of the probability density distribution of attendance A.
The distribution is obtained from the transition matrix Eq. (7) for
. The value of the pinning pattern indicator
is set as 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0 in (a–d), respectively and the pinning fraction
ranges from 0.02 to 0.9.

which is a sum of two factors: and
. In contrast to the special case of
treated in previous works4,11, the more general cases are that the expected value
is not equal to the capacity
. Nonzero values of
are a result of the biased pinning pattern (
) or improper response to the limited capacities of the resources. In fact, recent studies of the flux-fluctuation law in complex dynamical systems indicated that the variance of the system is determined by the two factors: intrinsic fluctuations and external driving56,57,58,59,60,61,62.
Stable distribution of attendance
To quantify the process of biased pinning control, we derive a discrete-time master equation and then discuss the effect of network topology on control.
Discrete-time master equation for biased pinning control
To understand the response of the Boolean dynamics to pinning control with varied values of the pinning pattern indicator , we generalize our previously developed analysis11. Let
be the probability for a neighbor of one given free agent to be pinned so that the probability of encountering a free agent is
. The transition probability of the system from
to
can be expressed in terms of
. In particular, note that the state transition is due to updating of the
free agents, as the remaining
agents are fixed. To simplify notations, we set
,
and
, for
. The conditional transition probability from i at t to k at t + 1 is

where is the probability for a free agent to choose + with the first and second terms representing the contributions of the pinned − and free − neighbors, respectively. In the Boolean system, the values of attendance A oscillate about its equilibrium value11. The transition probability between the state at t and
can be expressed as a function of
:

Equation (7) takes into account the effect of pinning patterns, which was ignored previously11. The resulting balance equation governing the dynamics of the Markov chains becomes

which is the discrete-time master equation. The stable state that the system evolves into can be defined in the matrix form as

where is an
matrix with elements
and
is the corresponding vector of
with A ranging from 0 to N.
The probability distribution is a binomial function with various expectation values, as shown in Fig. 3. In addition, the probability
is zero for
, which defines the boundary condition in the sense that there are
pinned agents. Once the stable distribution
is obtained from Eq. (9), the cumulative variance of the system can be calculated from

The theoretical prediction of as a function of
can thus be made through (a) identifying the function
, (b) defining the matrix
that depends on
and
and (c) calculating the stable state
.
Effect of network topology on pinning control
The topology of the network system has an effect on the probability . For the particular case of scale-free networks with degree exponent
, our previous work11 demonstrated that preferential pinning of the large-degree agents leads to
. Here, we consider systems with degree distribution
, where
is the minimum degree of the network. For the DPP scheme where pinning occurs in the order from large to small degree agents, the relation between the minimum degree of pinned agents (denoted by
and the pinning fraction
is

For a given pinning fraction in which all the agents with
are pinned, the probability
for one neighbor of a given free agent to be a pinned agent is given by

Here, Eqs. (11) and (12) are applicable to the DPP scheme on networks of any degree distribution without degree correlation. The underlying assumption in Eq. (12) is that the degrees of the neighboring agents are not correlated, i.e., the neighbors of the pinned agents obey the same degree distribution
of the whole system. For a scale-free network,
as a function of
can be expressed as

For the special case of , Eq. (13) reduces to the specific relationship obtained earlier11:
. As indicated by Eqs. (7, the specific form of matrix
with respect to
can be obtained by substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (7), leading to the distribution
and finally the variance of the system
as a function of
. Figure 4 displays the theoretical predicted
(dashed curves) for various values of the pinning fraction
and of the pinning pattern indicator
. The trend and, more importantly, the existence of the optimal pinning fraction
, agree well with the simulation results (marked with different symbols). In the limit
, the system approaches a well-mixed state that can be fully characterized by Eq. (13), indicating that the simulation results approach the curve predicted by the mean-field theory as the average degree
is increased.
Figure 5 shows the theoretical prediction of for scale-free networks with different values of the degree exponent γ, which agrees well with the results from direct simulation as in Fig. 2. For the case of highly heterogeneous networks
, the theoretical prediction deviates slightly from the numerical results for the reason that the networks in simulation inevitably exhibit certain topological features that are not taken into account in the theoretical analysis of
, such as the degree correlation.
Optimal pinning
Our analysis based on the master equation (8) applies to systems with and identical resource capacity. We now consider the more general case of varying
values to further understand the optimal pinning control scheme.
Deviation of expected attendance from resource capacity
The dependence of on
can be obtained through the general form of the response matrix
. For convenience, we use the column vector
to denote the fraction of the agents pinned at + and −, where
,
is the fraction of free agents adopting states + and −, respectively, with
. The state of the system can be expressed as
, from which we have

At the next time step, the expected value of the state based on through the response matrix
can be written as

Substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (15), we get the relationship between and
. A self-consistency process stipulated by Eqs. (14) and (15) can yield the stable state of the system with the expected number of agents choosing + given by

In a free system without pinning, the rational response of agents to nonidentical capacities of resources leads to Eq. (3), implying the relationship
. From Eq. (16), we can obtain ε as a function of the value of the pinning pattern indicator
, the elements of the matrix
, the pinning fraction
and the parameter
associated with network topology. We have

which has the form of separated variables associated with and
.
Optimal pinning pattern and fraction
Optimizing the system requires minimum , i.e.,
in Eq. (17), leading to two independent solutions:


which respectively correspond to the optimal value of the pinning pattern indicator and the optimal pinning fraction
. Here, for convenience, we define a parameter:
so that Eq. (18b) can be expressed concisely as
. Once the values of
and
satisfy either Eq. (18a) or Eq. (18b), we can obtain
. The variance
depends on the fluctuation factor
only.
Equation (18a) specifies the pinning pattern with the same ratio as that of the resource capacity. The Boolean dynamics studied previously11 is a special case where the optimal pinning pattern indicator is (i.e.,
for systems with
and the variance
is simply determined by the factor
alone.
From Eq. (18b), we see that the optimal pinning fraction is independent of
but depends on both the network structure through
and on the response function
. Additionally, the condition
and nonzero denominator require

The function for scale-free networks, as in Eq. (13), increases monotonically with
. Figure 6(a) displays the curves
and
, i.e., both sides of Eq. (18b). The existence of nonzero
for
demands
Optimal pinning fraction.
(a) Intersections of the curves and
denote nonzero optimal pinning fraction
given by Eq. (18b). The scale-free networks have the degree exponents
, 2.5, 2.7 and 3.0, respectively. The response function is for
(corresponding to
. (b) Contour map of
in the parameter space of
and
for scale-free networks with
. In the lower-left region below the boundary
(white dashed line), nonzero solution of
cannot be obtained. (c) Optimal pinning fraction
as a function of
for scale-free networks. The analytical results from Eq. (18b) (red solid curve) and the simulation results (black open squares) agree well with each other. The red arrow marks the theoretical prediction of the boundary, where nonzero
solutions exist on the left side. (d) For ER random networks,
as a function of
. Theoretical results from Eq. (18b) (red open circle) and simulation results (black open squares) are shown. The boundaries 1 and 2 obtained theoretically (pointed to by solid arrows), respectively, stand for the constraint in Eqs. (19) and (22). In (c,d), the value of
varies but
is set to 0.9. The scale-free and random networks used in the simulations have
and
.

For scale-free networks, diverges at
. Equation (20) thus holds, implying that the DPP pinning scheme has a nonzero optimal pinning fraction
, leading to
. However, for homogeneous networks, Eq. (20) may not hold. In this case, a more specific implicit condition can be obtained from Eq. (20) through the following analysis. In particular, without an analytical expression of
, the derivative of
with respect to
can be obtained from Eqs. (11) and (12):

For degree preferential pinning, in the limit , the maximum degree for free agents is
. We thus have

which requires that the network be heterogeneous. For , we have
, ensuring the existence of a nonzero
value for
.
The contour map of the optimal pinning fraction in the parameter space of
and
for scale-free networks with
is shown in Fig. 6(b). The boundary
associated with condition Eq. (19) is represented by the white dashed line, where nonzero solutions of
do not exist below the lower-left region. Figure 6(c,d) show
for
as a function of
for scale-free and random networks, respectively, where
is varied and
is fixed to 0.9. The theoretical prediction of
[red solid curve in (c) and red open circle in (d)] is given by the intersections of the curves
and
in Fig. 6(a). For scale-free networks, since Eq. (20) holds, Eq. (21) is the only constraint on the value of
(red dashed arrow), with the region at the right-hand side yielding nonzero
solutions. The red solid curve in Fig. 6(c) represents the theoretical prediction and the open squares denote the simulation results from scale-free networks of size
, power-law exponent
and average degree
.
For random networks, the existence of nonzero solutions requires that Eqs. (19) and (21) or (22) hold. For the Poisson degree distribution, the maximum degree of the network can be calculated from

We can obtain an estimate of the value of that satisfies Eq. (22), as indicated by the blue arrow (labeled as boundary 2) in Fig. 6(d). The right-hand side of this point satisfies both Eqs. (19) and (22), implying the existence of nonzero
. Comparison of the results from random and scale-free networks with different scaling exponents (Figs 2,5 and 6) shows that, stronger heterogeneity tends to enhance the values of
, which can also be seen from Eq. (20).
To better understand the non-monotonic behavior of with
, we provide a physical picture of the behavioral change for
greater or less than
. The effect of pinning control is determined by the number of edges between pinned and free agents, which are pinning-free edges. For a small pinning fraction
, the average effect per pinned agent on the system (represented by the number of pinned-free edges per pinned agent) is relatively large. However, as
is increased, the average impact is reduced for two reasons: (a) an increase in the edges within the pinned agents’ community itself (i.e., two connected pinned agents), which has no effect on control and (b) a decrease in the number of free agents, which directly reduces the number of pinned-free edges. Consider the special case of
and
. For small
, the pinned + agents have a significant impact so that the free agents tend to overestimate the probability of winning by adopting −. In this case, the expected value
is smaller than 0.5N, corresponding to
. For highly heterogeneous systems, the average impact per pinned agent is larger for a given small value of
. As
is increased, the average influence per pinned agent reduces and, consequently,
restores towards
. For
and
, the system variance [Eq. (5)] is minimized due to
and the corresponding pinning fraction achieves the optimal value
. For strongly heterogeneous systems, due to the large initial average impact caused by pinning the hub agents, the optimal pinning fraction
appears in the larger
region. Further increase in
with
will lead to
and
, thereby introducing nonzero
again and, consequently, generating an increasing trend in
.
Collapse of variance
For certain networks, the variance is determined by the values of the pinning pattern indicator
and the pinning fraction
. Our analysis so far focuses on the contribution of
to the variance
as the pinning fraction
is increased but for fixed
. It is thus useful to define a quantity related to the variance
, which can be expressed in the form of separated variables. For two different values of the pinning pattern indicator,
and
, for a given value of
, the relative weight of
can be obtained from Eq. (17) as

where is a function of both
and
. Remarkably, the ratio λ depends on
and
but it is independent of
, due to the form of separated variables in Eq. (17). From the simple relationship Eq. (24), we can define the relative changes in these quantities due to an increase in the value of
from a reference value
as


and then obtain the change rate associated with and
as,

where is independent of
. In the limit
, the rate of change
becomes

Figure 7 shows as a function of
for scale-free networks, where the value of the reference pinning pattern indicator is
. To obtain the values of
, we first calculate Ω by substituting the values of
,
and the elements of
into Eqs. (24) and (26). We then obtain
by substituting the values of
into Eq. (25), with
either from simulation as in Figs 1 and 2 or from theoretical analysis as in Fig. 5. We see that the
values from simulation results of
[Fig. 7(a–c) marked by “Simulation Results”] and theoretical prediction of
[Fig. 7(d–f) marked by “Theoretical Results”] show the behavior in which the curves of
for different values of
collapse into a single one. This indicates that
depends solely on the pinning fraction
; it is independent of the value of the pinning pattern indicator
. Extensive simulations and analysis of scale-free networks with different average degree
or different degree exponent γ verify the generality of the collapsing behavior.
Collapse of κ for different pinning patterns.
(a–c) Simulation results of from scale-free networks for
, 2.7 and 3.0, which correspond to the results of
in Figs 1(d) and 2(a,c), respectively. (d–f) Theoretical results of
from Eq. (27) for the cases shown in Fig. 5(a,c,d), respectively. The reference pinning pattern indicator is
.
From Eq. (28), we see that the variance and the quantity
are closely related. For example, a smaller value of
indicates that
contributes more to the variance of
as
is changed and vice versa. In Fig. 7,
corresponds to the intersecting points of the curves of
with different values of
shown in Figs 1,2 and 5. It can also be verified analytically that, the minimal point with
coincides with the optimal pinning fraction
at which
is minimized, which is supported by simulation results in Figs 1,2,5 and 7.
Variance in the form of separated variables
From Eq. (27), for a given value of the reference pinning pattern indicator , we can obtain an expression of
in the form of separated variables as

where is independent of the change in
and
is independent of
. The consequence of Eq. (29) is remarkable, since it defines in the parameter space
a function
in the form of separated variables which, as compared with the original quantity
, not only simplifies the description but also gives a more intuitive picture of the system behavior. Specifically, for the MG dynamics, the influences of various factors on the variance
or
can be classified into two parts: (I) the function
that reflects the effects of the pinning fraction
and the network structure among agents (in terms of the degree distribution
, the average degree
and the scaling exponent γ) and (II) the function Ω that characterizes the impact of the pinning pattern indicator
and the response of agents to resource capacities
and
through
. Figure 8(a,b) show the values of
as a function of
for
and 0.8, respectively, whereas Fig. 8(c) shows
for several values of
. From Eqs (24) and (26), we see that Ω is a quadratic function of
with the symmetry axis at
, which depends on the setting of response function
. The second derivative of the function depends on
.
From the definition in Eq. (25), the variance of the system for arbitrary values of and
can be obtained as

where specifies the reference pinning pattern. Once we have the two respective
curves for the two specific pinning patterns as specified by
and
,
in the whole parameter space
can be calculated accordingly. In particular, the quantities
and
serve as a holographic representation of the dynamical behavior of the system in the whole parameter space. In particular, one can first obtain
from Eqs (17) and (26) and then calculate
and finally obtain the value of
by substituting
and
into Eq. (30).
Analysis of Gini index
The equality of wealth is also an important criterion to assess the performance of a resource allocation system, which can be characterized by the Gini index. For MG systems without control, it was found that inequality in wealth can be pronounced when the resource utility is optimized63. We calculate the Gini index to uncover the interplay between pinning control and wealth equality in Boolean systems. In particular, the Gini index is defined as

where N is the total number of agents in the system and is the ratio of the wealth earned by agent j over the total amount of wealth in the whole system. Note that
is ranked in the ascending order as
. During each round of the game (each time step), the wealth of each minority agent is set to increase by one unit, while the wealth of the majority agents is unchanged. The accumulated wealth of each agent over a long time interval (e.g.,
time steps) can be used to calculate the Gini index of the system according to its definition. Figure 9 shows the value of the Gini index
as a function of
, where panels (a–c) are the results for scale-free networks54 of scaling exponent
and system size
and for three different values of the average degree:
, 14 and 40, respectively. Results for scale-free networks55 of size
and three different values of the scaling exponent:
, 2.7 and 3.0, are shown in panels (d–f), respectively. In each panel, the value of the pinning pattern indicator
ranges from 0.6 to 1.0. In reference to the variance
in Figs 1 and 2 for the same networks under identical dynamical parameter setting, we see that the value of
reaches a local minimum at the optimal pinning fraction
. This implies that optimal use of resources and equality in wealth in a population can be realized simultaneously through pinning control.
Gini index G0 as a function of the pinning fraction ρp.
(a–c) Results obtained from scale-free networks with degree scaling exponent 54, system size
and average degree
, 14 and 40, respectively. (d–f) Results from scale-free networks55 of size
and degree scaling exponent
, 2.7 and 3.0, respectively. The value of the pinning pattern indicator
ranges from 0.6 to 1.0.
As shown in each panel of Fig. 9, for larger values of (i.e., larger biases in pinning), the value of
is generally larger and more sensitive to changes in the pinning fraction
, i.e.,
varies more rapidly with
. When the system’s utilization of resource is optimized at
, we have
(because
- see Eq. (5) and discussions). We see that the Gini index can be determined through the fluctuation
of
. As a result, if the pinning scheme is more biased (a larger value of
, the fluctuations of
are smaller, leading to a smaller value of
. In addition, for the scale-free networks with larger average degree
,
increases more rapidly as
is increased from zero.
Discussions
The phenomenon of herding is ubiquitous in social and economical systems. Herding behavior may play a positive role in certain types of dynamical processes, with examples such as promoting cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics64,65,66 and encouraging vaccination to prevent or suppress epidemic spreading67. However, in systems that involve and/or rely on fair resource allocation, the emergence of herding behavior is undesirable, as in such a state a vast majority of the individuals in the system share only a few resources, a precursor of system collapse at a global scale. A generic manifestation of herding behavior is relatively large fluctuations in the dynamical variables of the system such as the numbers of individuals sharing certain resources. It is thus desirable to develop effective control methods to suppress herding. An existing and powerful mathematical framework to model and understand the herding behavior is minority games. Investigating control of herding in the MG framework may provide useful insights into developing more realistic control method for real-world systems.
Built upon our previous works in MG systems4,11, in this paper we articulate, test and analyze a general pinning scheme to control herding behavior in MG systems. A striking finding is the universal existence of an optimal pinning fraction that minimizes the variance and realizes the equality among the agents in the system, regardless of system details such as the degree of homogeneity of the resource capacities, topology and structures of the underlying network and different patterns of pinning. This means that, generally, the efficiency of the system can be optimized for some relatively small pinning fraction. Employing the mean-field approach, we develop a detailed theory to understand and predict the dynamics of the MG system subject to pinning control, for various network topologies and pinning schemes. The key observation underlying our theory is the two factors contributing to the system fluctuations: intrinsic dynamical fluctuations and systematic deviation of agents’ expected attendance from resource capacity. The theoretically predicted fluctuations (quantified by the system variance) agree with those from direct simulation. In particular, in the large degree limit, for a variety of combinations of the network and pinning parameters, the numerical results approach those predicted from our mean field theory. Our theory also correctly predicts the optimal pinning fraction for various system and control settings.
In real world systems in which resource allocation is an important component, resource capacities and agent interactions can be diverse and time dependent. To develop MG model to understand the effects of diversity and time dependence on herding dynamics and to exploit the understanding to develop pinning control methods to suppress or eliminate herding are open issues at the present. Furthermore, implementation of pinning control in real systems may be associated with incentive policies that provide compensations or rewards to the pinned agents. How to reduce the optimal pinning fraction then becomes an interesting issue. Our results provide insights and represent a step toward the goal of designing highly stable and efficient resource allocation systems.
Additional Information
How to cite this article: Zhang, J.-Q. et al. Controlling herding in minority game systems. Sci. Rep. 6, 20925; doi: 10.1038/srep20925 (2016).
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Acknowledgements
We thank Prof. L. Huang for helpful discussions. This work was supported by ARO under Grant W911NF-14-1-0504 and the NSF of China under Grants Nos. 11575072, 11135001 and 11275003.
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Z.G.H. and Y.C.L. devised the research project. J.Q.Z., Z.G.H. and R.S. performed numerical simulations. J.Q.Z., Z.G.H. and Z.X.W. analyzed the results. J.Q.Z., Z.G.H. and Y.C.L. wrote the paper.
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Zhang, JQ., Huang, ZG., Wu, ZX. et al. Controlling herding in minority game systems. Sci Rep 6, 20925 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/srep20925
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