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Emotions such as empathy and disgust might be at the root of morality, but psychologists should also study the roles of deliberation and debate in how our opinions shift over time, argues Paul Bloom.
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Satprem's book "Sri Aurobindo or the Adventure of Consciousness" (1996-2003, translated from 1970 French by Michel Danino) is relevant here in its connection between levels of human consciousness called the vital, the psyche and so on, as gleaned from spiritual experiences of Sri Aurobindo and Mother. To put it in perspective especially relative to later (our) period vis-a-vis, e.g., Sri Aurobindo Ashram in Puduchcheri (= Pondicherry), I quote from last part of the book just before the raison-de-etre and establishment of the Ashram are described.
[Quote] [Author's Note (of 1984): The following subchapter, written in 1963, has only (and regretfully) a historical value. Today, after Mother's departure in 1973, the "Sri Aurobindo Ashram" is scarcely more than a prosperous Institution without relation to Sri Aurobindo's and Mother's evolutionary experience. For more details on Mother's own work after Sri Aurobindo's departure in 1950, as well as on the events surrounding her passing away in 1973, see Mother's Agenda (13 volumes, her own recorded account of the work in the body from 1951 to 1973), and Mother's biography by Satprem (in 3 volumes): 1. The Divine Materialism, 2. The New Species, 3. The Mutation of Death.]
Also relevant may be the timeline of Sri Aurobindo's life as given in a slim biography by Manoj Das in Makers of Indian Literature series published by Sahitya Akademi, where possible significance for ending World War 2 of spiritual activities at Pondicherry (= Puduchcheri) is indicated briefly.
Gerald Guild
"It would be a mistake as scientists ? and as politically and socially engaged citizens ? to dismiss the importance of this reflective process in shaping our morality and, consequently, the world in which we live."
I agree whole heatedly! I contend, as Sam Harris did in his TED Conference speech, that morality is cleanly within the domain of science – and that all forms of reason should be applied when contemplating this non mystical notion. It is when mysticism and Bronze Aged ideas guide morality that people suffer. The changing zeitgeist you discuss pose similar challenges. If transient social values guide morals, as they have in the past, we too (or at least those in the minority tend to) suffer. Do you suppose science can be more timeless in the delineation of morality moving forward?
Larry Arnhart
Professor Bloom should recognize that he has rediscovered rhetoric.
Beginning in ancient Greece--with Aristotle's RHETORIC--there is a long tradition of rhetorical moral psychology that combines reason and emotion. Rhetoricians reason with the emotions of their audiences. Book Two of Aristotle's RHETORIC is a meticulous study of the moral emotions. Rhetoricians move people by appealing to their emotions. But this persuasive appeal to the emotions is an exercise in rational argument, because the emotions depend upon judgments about the world, and so rhetoricians can change the emotions by changing the judgments on which they depend.
The history of the moral and political debate over slavery illustrates this rhetorical moral psychology in which reason and emotion are interdependent.
Aristotle was a biologist, and one can see the underlying biological science in his rhetorical moral psychology.
In some of his writings on the moral emotions, Jonathan Haidt has referred to Aristotle's RHETORIC. Unfortunately, those who work on the biological psychology of morality are generally ignorant of the rhetorical tradition that began with Aristotle.
Torfi Johannesson
It should be noted that change in attitude towards animals is to a large extent rooted in increased knowledge on the capability of animals to experience pain/suffering. Many 18 century scientists argued that animals could not suffer and treated them accordingly. Likewise, slavery was often justified by the claims that humans could be divided into races and that the races differed fundamentally. Both proved utterly wrong.
Delfina Vannucci
It seems to me that beyond fundamental empathy and disgust, morality is largely influenced by culture, not rationality. Culture is strongly influenced by vague and often unfounded fears and misgivings, as well as persuasion and manipulation by the powerful. That is how fundamentally moral people can overcome their disgust at war, torture, persecution, racism, etc., and become convinced that their reprehensible actions are perfectly in keeping with their moral values.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene
In his recent contribution to this journal (Nature 464, 490; 2010), Paul Bloom challenges the ?modern consensus? among psychologists on the mostly emotional origins of morality. He confronts this view with the fact that morals have evolved. This challenge is well-made because any theory of morality has to explain the phenomenon of moral change. It seems that the rationalist conceptions of morality, as held by many contemporary and past philosophers (but not psychologists), have less trouble with this phenomenon. For these conceptions, the importance of ?rational deliberation and debate? in shaping and changing our morals comes into sight quite naturally. Bloom suggests that those who believe in the exclusively emotional origins of morality, however, lack the resources to explain phenomena such as ?the shifts in opinions on issues such as slavery and animal rights?. He claims that what is missing here ?is an understanding of the role of deliberate persuasion?. At the end of his article, Bloom seems to insinuate that at the heart of morality, there are cannot only be emotions but there must be an element of reason that would explain why morality is susceptible to change induced by rational deliberation. It is, however, not entirely clear that deliberative processes and interactions really ?shape our morality?. Clearly, our moral judgements are influenced by reflective processes, both on an individual and on a collective historical scale, but this does not automatically imply that our morals themselves, i.e., the pertinent values and norms, are susceptible to being influenced by reason. This is because our moral values and norms can only very rarely be immediately applied to a given situation without additional cognitive elements in order to result in a moral judgement. Typically, in order to subsume a situation under a moral norm or to apply a moral value, additional non-moral, namely cognitive, elements must enter the scene. To use an example from my own childhood: in order to judge that throwing stones whilst in the mountains is morally prohibited, one must know that this might hurt others even if nobody seems to be around. Similarly, ?new moral ideas, such as the immorality of sexism or the value of democracy? may result not from a change of our morals themselves but from a change of the cognitive rules how to subsume a given situation under a certain norm. As long as I believe that the king is really a very special person (which is not a moral conviction), I will not believe in the moral value of democracy. Thus, although the phenomenon of change of moral judgements due to reflective processes is important and must be addressed, it does not necessarily imply that reason is already implanted at the heart of morality.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science, Leibniz Universit? Hannover, Im Moore 21, D ? 30167 Hannover, Germany. e-mail: hoyningen@ww.uni-hannover.de
Isabelle Wentworth
I think the author may have oversimplified Hume's stance on the metaethical role of rationality: "It has been observ'd, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites the passions by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means, of exerting any passion". (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 511) Does this not adequately account for moral change over time?
Dilip G. Banhatti
Satprem's book "Sri Aurobindo or the Adventure of Consciousness" (1996-2003, translated from 1970 French by Michel Danino) is relevant here in its connection between levels of human consciousness called the vital, the psyche and so on, as gleaned from spiritual experiences of Sri Aurobindo and Mother. To put it in perspective especially relative to later (our) period vis-a-vis, e.g., Sri Aurobindo Ashram in Puduchcheri (= Pondicherry), I quote from last part of the book just before the raison-de-etre and establishment of the Ashram are described.
[Quote]
[Author's Note (of 1984): The following subchapter, written in 1963, has only (and regretfully) a historical value. Today, after Mother's departure in 1973, the "Sri Aurobindo Ashram" is scarcely more than a prosperous Institution without relation to Sri Aurobindo's and Mother's evolutionary experience. For more details on Mother's own work after Sri Aurobindo's departure in 1950, as well as on the events surrounding her passing away in 1973, see Mother's Agenda (13 volumes, her own recorded account of the work in the body from 1951 to 1973), and Mother's biography by Satprem (in 3 volumes): 1. The Divine Materialism, 2. The New Species, 3. The Mutation of Death.]
Also relevant may be the timeline of Sri Aurobindo's life as given in a slim biography by Manoj Das in Makers of Indian Literature series published by Sahitya Akademi, where possible significance for ending World War 2 of spiritual activities at Pondicherry (= Puduchcheri) is indicated briefly.
Gerald Guild
"It would be a mistake as scientists ? and as politically and socially engaged citizens ? to dismiss the importance of this reflective process in shaping our morality and, consequently, the world in which we live."
I agree whole heatedly! I contend, as Sam Harris did in his TED Conference speech, that morality is cleanly within the domain of science – and that all forms of reason should be applied when contemplating this non mystical notion. It is when mysticism and Bronze Aged ideas guide morality that people suffer. The changing zeitgeist you discuss pose similar challenges. If transient social values guide morals, as they have in the past, we too (or at least those in the minority tend to) suffer. Do you suppose science can be more timeless in the delineation of morality moving forward?
Larry Arnhart
Professor Bloom should recognize that he has rediscovered rhetoric.
Beginning in ancient Greece--with Aristotle's RHETORIC--there is a long tradition of rhetorical moral psychology that combines reason and emotion. Rhetoricians reason with the emotions of their audiences. Book Two of Aristotle's RHETORIC is a meticulous study of the moral emotions. Rhetoricians move people by appealing to their emotions. But this persuasive appeal to the emotions is an exercise in rational argument, because the emotions depend upon judgments about the world, and so rhetoricians can change the emotions by changing the judgments on which they depend.
The history of the moral and political debate over slavery illustrates this rhetorical moral psychology in which reason and emotion are interdependent.
Aristotle was a biologist, and one can see the underlying biological science in his rhetorical moral psychology.
In some of his writings on the moral emotions, Jonathan Haidt has referred to Aristotle's RHETORIC. Unfortunately, those who work on the biological psychology of morality are generally ignorant of the rhetorical tradition that began with Aristotle.
Torfi Johannesson
It should be noted that change in attitude towards animals is to a large extent rooted in increased knowledge on the capability of animals to experience pain/suffering. Many 18 century scientists argued that animals could not suffer and treated them accordingly. Likewise, slavery was often justified by the claims that humans could be divided into races and that the races differed fundamentally. Both proved utterly wrong.
Delfina Vannucci
It seems to me that beyond fundamental empathy and disgust, morality is largely influenced by culture, not rationality. Culture is strongly influenced by vague and often unfounded fears and misgivings, as well as persuasion and manipulation by the powerful. That is how fundamentally moral people can overcome their disgust at war, torture, persecution, racism, etc., and become convinced that their reprehensible actions are perfectly in keeping with their moral values.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene
In his recent contribution to this journal (Nature 464, 490; 2010), Paul Bloom challenges the ?modern consensus? among psychologists on the mostly emotional origins of morality. He confronts this view with the fact that morals have evolved. This challenge is well-made because any theory of morality has to explain the phenomenon of moral change. It seems that the rationalist conceptions of morality, as held by many contemporary and past philosophers (but not psychologists), have less trouble with this phenomenon. For these conceptions, the importance of ?rational deliberation and debate? in shaping and changing our morals comes into sight quite naturally. Bloom suggests that those who believe in the exclusively emotional origins of morality, however, lack the resources to explain phenomena such as ?the shifts in opinions on issues such as slavery and animal rights?. He claims that what is missing here ?is an understanding of the role of deliberate persuasion?. At the end of his article, Bloom seems to insinuate that at the heart of morality, there are cannot only be emotions but there must be an element of reason that would explain why morality is susceptible to change induced by rational deliberation.
It is, however, not entirely clear that deliberative processes and interactions really ?shape our morality?. Clearly, our moral judgements are influenced by reflective processes, both on an individual and on a collective historical scale, but this does not automatically imply that our morals themselves, i.e., the pertinent values and norms, are susceptible to being influenced by reason. This is because our moral values and norms can only very rarely be immediately applied to a given situation without additional cognitive elements in order to result in a moral judgement. Typically, in order to subsume a situation under a moral norm or to apply a moral value, additional non-moral, namely cognitive, elements must enter the scene. To use an example from my own childhood: in order to judge that throwing stones whilst in the mountains is morally prohibited, one must know that this might hurt others even if nobody seems to be around. Similarly, ?new moral ideas, such as the immorality of sexism or the value of democracy? may result not from a change of our morals themselves but from a change of the cognitive rules how to subsume a given situation under a certain norm. As long as I believe that the king is really a very special person (which is not a moral conviction), I will not believe in the moral value of democracy. Thus, although the phenomenon of change of moral judgements due to reflective processes is important and must be addressed, it does not necessarily imply that reason is already implanted at the heart of morality.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science, Leibniz Universit? Hannover, Im Moore 21, D ? 30167 Hannover, Germany.
e-mail: hoyningen@ww.uni-hannover.de
Isabelle Wentworth
I think the author may have oversimplified Hume's stance on the metaethical role of rationality: "It has been observ'd, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites the passions by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means, of exerting any passion". (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 511) Does this not adequately account for moral change over time?