Extended Data Fig. 4: Normative beliefs, descriptive beliefs, and conditional rule-conformity in the presence of an externality, and weak and strong incentives.
From: Why people follow rules
The four nested treatments consist of a replication of the traffic light task without peers and no externality (Baseline, BL; replicating Fig. 1) and reported in Fig. 4, and three new treatments where a rule violation triggers an externality (a foregone donation of $1 to a charity, treatment Externality, EX) and where rule violations are punished with a probability of 10% (treatment Weak Punishment, WP) or 90% (treatment Strong Punishment, SP). Punishment implied loss of all earnings (except the flat participation fee). Panels show data across all four treatments a Normative beliefs bn, that is, social appropriateness of rule-following and rule-breaking (total n = 404). Black dots are mean ratings. Pairs of bars show ratings for rule-following (lhs) and rule-breaking (rhs); legend as in Fig. 2a. b Descriptive beliefs bd of rule-following (total n = 408); legend as in Fig. 2b. (c and d) Average conditional rule-conformity, measured with the strategy method by eliciting people’s rule-following or rule-breaking as a function of the percentage of people who c disapprove of a rule violation and d conform with the rule; bars show ±1 s.e.m (c: total n = 607; d: total n = 619).
