Table 2 Probabilities with which an observer assigns a good reputation to a donor, given the donor’s action toward the recipient and the observer’s evaluation of the recipient at the present time. Rows indicate whether the donor chooses to cooperate (C) or defect (D) with the recipient, and columns indicate whether the observer assigns a good (G) or bad (B) reputation to the recipient at the present time step.
From: Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment
Social norm | A | SJ | SS | SH | SC | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
\({\mathrm{{Ob.}}}\rightarrow {\mathrm{{Re.}}}\) | G | B | G | B | G | B | G | B | G | B | |
\({\mathrm{{Do.}}}\rightarrow {\mathrm{{Re.}}}\) | C | \(a^{\mathrm{{GC}}}_{A}\) | \(a^{\mathrm{{BC}}}_{A}\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) |
D | \(a^{\mathrm{{GD}}}_{A}\) | \(a^{\mathrm{{BD}}}_{A}\) | \(e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(1-e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(e_2\) | \(e_2\) | |
