Table 3 Analytical solutions to Eq. (19). h is defined as \(h(p)=p(1-e_1)+(1-p)e_1\) (see Eq. (1)). We employ the convention, \(\prod _{k=1}^{0} \cdot = 1\). From this table, we see that, for SJ norm, neither the error rate in action \(e_1\) nor the error rate in assessment \(e_2\) influences the stationary distribution. For SS and SH, \(e_1\) influences only masses \(q_j\), and \(e_2\) influences masses \(q_j\), means \(\mu _j\), and variances \(\sigma _j^2\). For SC, \(e_1\) influences nothing, but \(e_2\) influences means \(\mu _j\) and variances \(\sigma _j^2\).

From: Reputation structure in indirect reciprocity under noisy and private assessment

Social norm

# of Gaussians used

Mass, \(q_j\)

Mean, \(\mu _j\)

Variance, \(\sigma _j^2\)

SJ

1

1

\(\displaystyle \frac{1}{2}\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{1}{4N}\)

SS

\(\infty\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{\prod _{k=1}^{j-1}(1-h(\mu _k))}{\sum _{\ell =1}^{\infty }\prod _{k=1}^{\ell -1}(1-h(\mu _k))}\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{1-\{-(1-2e_2)\}^{j}}{2}\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{1-(1-2e_2)^{2j}}{4N}\)

SH

\(\infty\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{\prod _{k=1}^{j-1}h(\mu _k)}{\sum _{\ell =1}^{\infty }\prod _{k=1}^{\ell -1}h(\mu _k)}\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{1-(1-2e_2)^{j}}{2}\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{1-(1-2e_2)^{2j}}{4N}\)

SC

2

\(\displaystyle \frac{1}{2}\)

\(\mu _1=1-e_2, \mu _2=e_2\)

\(\displaystyle \frac{e_2(1-e_2)}{N}\)