Table 1 SR native security mechanism.

Source routing^2,11

The head node of the flow encapsulates the label stack to specify the flow path

Malicious drainage

Trust domain^2,11

Only the source route is used in the domain, and the source route information is cleared by setting the C-flag flag in SRH when the data packet leaves the domain

Label leakage

Package validation^2,11

RFC8754 stipulates that the optional TLV (Type-Length-Value) object field of SRH in SRv6 message carries HMAC TLV

SRv6 data message tampering

Load leveling^2,11

Anycast-SID will balance the traffic from a single node to multiple nodes

Single point failure

Fault detect^2,11

Local trigger (such as BFD(Bidirectional Forwarding Detection)), remote intra-domain trigger (IGP flooding), remote cross-domain trigger (updated by BGP-LS), end-to-end SR Policy survivability detection, explicit candidate path verification and dynamic candidate path recalculation

–

Failure recovery^2,11

TI-LFA (Topology-Independent Loop-free Alternate) node protection

–

Service hiding^2,11

Use the “mpls ip-ttl-propagation disable” command to hide the multi-hop MPLS network as a single-hop network, thus invalidating the traceroute command

Traditional topology detection, inter-domain topology detection

By binding the SR Policy of the specified domain to BSID, users outside the domain cannot obtain the topology within the domain based on the candidate path information