Table 3 An evaluative examination of the proposed protocol in relation to different group AKA protocols within the Internet of Vehicles (IoVT) framework.

From: A secure group-based authentication protocol for IoVT in 5G-enabled smart transportation and road safety systems

Target achieved

Proposed protocol

5G-AKA33

Liu’s AKA34

Braeken AKA35

Shang’s AKA17

NAPV10

Ouaissa’s AKA18

Miao’s AKA16

\(\hbox {T}_{1}\): Mutual authentication

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{2}\): Third party involvement

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{3}\): Resistance to impersonation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{4}\): Resistance to MitM attack

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

\(\hbox {T}_{5}\): Subscriber privacy

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{6}\): Support group authentication

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{7}\): Unlinkability

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{8}\): Presence of user traceability

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

\(\hbox {T}_{9}\): Forward/Backward key secrecy

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

\(\hbox {T}_{10}\): Resistance to billing attack

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{11}\): Confidentiality & integrity

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{12}\): Presence of weak binding

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{13}\): Follow the standard

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

\(\hbox {T}_{14}\): Key confirmation

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

\(\hbox {T}_{15}\): Prevention of replay attacks

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

\(\hbox {T}_{16}\): Cryptosystem

Sym

Hybrid

Hybrid

Hybrid

Hybrid

Sym

Sym & ECDH

Hybrid