Table 3 An evaluative examination of the proposed protocol in relation to different group AKA protocols within the Internet of Vehicles (IoVT) framework.
Target achieved | Proposed protocol | 5G-AKA33 | Liu’s AKA34 | Braeken AKA35 | Shang’s AKA17 | NAPV10 | Ouaissa’s AKA18 | Miao’s AKA16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
\(\hbox {T}_{1}\): Mutual authentication | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{2}\): Third party involvement | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{3}\): Resistance to impersonation | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{4}\): Resistance to MitM attack | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
\(\hbox {T}_{5}\): Subscriber privacy | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{6}\): Support group authentication | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{7}\): Unlinkability | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{8}\): Presence of user traceability | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
\(\hbox {T}_{9}\): Forward/Backward key secrecy | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
\(\hbox {T}_{10}\): Resistance to billing attack | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{11}\): Confidentiality & integrity | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{12}\): Presence of weak binding | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{13}\): Follow the standard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No |
\(\hbox {T}_{14}\): Key confirmation | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No |
\(\hbox {T}_{15}\): Prevention of replay attacks | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
\(\hbox {T}_{16}\): Cryptosystem | Sym | Hybrid | Hybrid | Hybrid | Hybrid | Sym | Sym & ECDH | Hybrid |