Table 2 Heterogeneous effects of the ETS across programs and firms

From: Low-carbon innovation induced by emissions trading in China

 

Dependent variable (∆low-carbon patent)

Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test

alternative hypothesis

ETS

−0.007 (0.096)

−0.038 (0.0928)

−0.139 (0.155)

 

ETS*average permit price

0.000

0.000

0.003

High price > low price

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.003)

p = 0.97

ETS*auction = 1

0.018

0.016

0.016

Auction > no auction

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.077)

p = 0.99

ETS*mass-based = 1

0.069*

0.073**

0.083*

Mass-based > rate-based

(0.036)

(0.034)

(0.044)

p = 0.02

ETS*cap reduction = 1

−0.033

−0.035

−0.030

Cap reduction > no cap

(0.048)

(0.048)

(0.053)

p = 0.07

ETS*energy-intensive = 1

0.015

0.000

0.024

Energy-intensive > other

(0.050)

(0.047)

(0.052)

p = 0.19

ETS*no patent before = 1

−0.011

−0.009

−0.010

No patent before > patent

(0.041)

(0.041)

(0.046)

p = 0.30

ETS*Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

0.588

0.701

0.734

High-competition > other

(1.406)

(1.377)

(1.425)

p = 0.12

ETS*state-owned = 1

0.003

0.072

0.094*

State-owned > other

(0.035)

(0.043)

(0.046)

p = 0.34

ETS*foreign-owned = 1

−0.028

−0.001

0.002

Foreign-owned > other

(0.036)

(0.037)

(0.028)

p = 0.77

Firm characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

 

Matched firm pair dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

 

Excluding power plants

No

No

Yes

 

Observations

1332

1332

1198

 

Adjusted R-squared

0.204

0.208

0.216

 
  1. Note: Astersisks (*) and (**) indicate 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. In parentheses are standard errors clustered at the ETS program and province levels for observations in and outside ETS regions, respectively