Abstract
Although collision-like causes are fundamental in philosophical and psychological theories of causation, humans conceptualize many events as causes that lack direct contact. Here we argue that how people think and talk about different causes is deeply connected, and investigate how children learn this mapping. If Andy hits Suzy with his bike, Suzy falls into a fence and it breaks, Andy ‘caused’ the fence to break but Suzy ‘broke’ it. If Suzy forgets sunscreen and gets sunburned, the absence of sunscreen ‘caused’ Suzy’s sunburn, but the sun ‘burned’ her skin. We tested 691 children and 270 adults. Four-year-old children mapped ‘caused’ to distal causes and ‘broke’ to proximal causes (Experiment 1). Although 4-year-old children did not map ‘caused’ to absences until later (Experiment 2), they already referred to absences when asked ‘why’ an outcome occurred (Experiment 3). Our findings highlight the role of semantics and pragmatics in developing these mappings.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution
Access options
Access Nature and 54 other Nature Portfolio journals
Get Nature+, our best-value online-access subscription
$32.99 / 30 days
cancel any time
Subscribe to this journal
Receive 12 digital issues and online access to articles
$119.00 per year
only $9.92 per issue
Buy this article
- Purchase on SpringerLink
- Instant access to the full article PDF.
USD 39.95
Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout





Similar content being viewed by others
Data availability
All data are available on GitHub at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17572955 (ref. 86).
Code availability
All code is available on GitHub at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17572955 (ref. 86).
References
Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature 1978 edn (Clarendon Press, 1789).
Schlottmann, A. Perception versus knowledge of cause and effect in children: when seeing is believing. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 10, 111–115 (2001).
Goddu, M. K. & Gopnik, A. The development of human causal learning and reasoning. Nat. Rev. Psychol. 3, 319–339 (2024).
Rose, D., Sievers, E. & Nichols, S. Cause and burn. Cognition 207, 104517 (2021).
Song, G. & Wolff, P. in Language, Culture and Mind (eds Achard, M. & Kemmer, S.) 237–250 (Univ. Chicago Press, 2003).
Fodor, J. A. Three reasons for not deriving ‘kill’ from ‘cause to die’. Linguist. Inq. 1, 429–438 (1970).
McCawley, J. D. in Syntax and Semantics Vol. 9: Pragmatics (ed Cole, P.) 245–258 (Academic Press, 1978).
Pinker, S. Learnability and Cognition: the Acquisition of Argument Structure (MIT Press, 1989).
Shibatani, M. in Syntax and Semantics Vol. 6: The Grammar of Causative Constructions (ed Shibatani, M.) 1–40 (Academic Press, 1976).
Wierzbicka, A. The Semantics of Grammar (John Benjamins, 1988).
Aryawibawa, I. N., Qomariana, Y., Artawa, K. & Ambridge, B. Direct versus indirect causation as a semantic linguistic universal: using a computational model of English, Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese, and K’iche’ Mayan to predict grammaticality judgments in Balinese. Cogn. Sci. 45, e12974 (2021).
Wolff, P. Direct causation in the linguistic coding and individuation of causal events. Cognition 88, 1–48 (2003).
Wierzbicka, A. Why ‘kill’ does not mean ‘cause to die’: the semantics of action sentences. Found. Lang. 13, 491–528 (1975).
Levin, B. & Hovav, M. R. Two structures for compositionally derived events. In Proc. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 9 199–223 (Linguistic Society of America, 1999).
Dixon, R. M. W. in Changing Valency: Case Studies in Transitivity (eds Dixon, R. M. W. & Aikhenvald, A. Y.) 30–83 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).
Fillmore, C. J. in Semantics of Natural Language (eds Davidson, D. & Harman, G.) 1–24 (Springer, 1972).
Hall, N. in Causation and Counterfactuals (eds Collins, J. et al.) Ch. 9 (MIT Press, 2004).
Godfrey-Smith, P. in Oxford Handbook of Causation (eds Beebee, H. et al.) 326–337 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).
Dowe, P. Physical Causation (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).
Salmon, W. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton Univ. Press, 1984).
Lewis, D. Causation. J. Philos. 70, 556–567 (1973).
Bernstein, S. Omission impossible. Philos. Stud. 173, 2575–2589 (2016).
McGrath, S. Causation by omission: a dilemma. Philos. Stud. 123, 125–148 (2005).
Schaffer, J. Causation by disconnection. Philos. Sci. 67, 285–300 (2000).
Henne, P., Pinillos, Á. & De Brigard, F. Cause by omission and norm: not watering plants. Australas. J. Philos. 95, 270–283 (2017).
Gerstenberg, T. & Stephan, S. A counterfactual simulation model of causation by omission. Cognition 216, 104842 (2021).
Michotte, A. The Perception of Causality (Routledge, 1963).
Leslie, A. M. & Keeble, S. Do six-month-old infants perceive causality? Cognition 25, 265–288 (1987).
Muentener, P. & Carey, S. Infants’ causal representations of state change events. Cognition 61, 63–86 (2010).
Muentener, P., Bonawitz, E., Horowitz, A. & Schulz, L. Mind the gap: investigating toddlers’ sensitivity to contact relations in predictive events. PloS ONE 7, e34061 (2012).
Bonawitz, E. B. et al. Just do it? Investigating the gap between prediction and action in toddlers’ causal inferences. Cognition 115, 104–117 (2010).
Bullock, M. & Gelman, R. Preschool children’s assumptions about cause and effect: temporal ordering. Child Dev. 50, 89–96 (1979).
McCormack, T., O’Connor, E., Beck, S. & Feeney, A. The development of regret and relief about the outcomes of risky decisions. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 148, 1–19 (2016).
Shultz, T. R. Rules of causal attribution. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 47, 1–51 (1982).
German, T. P. & Nichols, S. Children’s counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains. Dev. Sci. 6, 514–523 (2003).
Schleifer, M., Shultz, T. R. & Lefebvre-Pinard, M. Children’s judgements of causality, responsibility and punishment in cases of harm due to omission. Br. J. Dev. Psychol. 1, 87–97 (1983).
Frank, M. C., Braginsky, M., Yurovsky, D. & Marchman, V. A. Wordbank: an open repository for developmental vocabulary data. J. Child Lang. 44, 677–694 (2017).
Bowerman, M. Learning the structure of causative verbs: a study in the relationship of cognitive, semantic, and syntactic development. Pap. Rep. Child Lang. Dev. 8, 142–178 (1974).
Gergely, G. & Bever, T. G. Related intuitions and the mental representation of causative verbs in adults and children. Cognition 23, 211–277 (1986).
Naigles, L. Children use syntax to learn verb meanings. J. Child Lang. 17, 357–374 (1990).
Bunger, A. & Lidz, J. Syntactic bootstrapping and the internal structure of causative events. In Proc. 28th Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development Vol. 28 74–85 (Cascadilla Press, 2004).
Bunger, A. & Lidz, J. Constrained flexibility in the acquisition of causative verbs. In Proc. Annual Boston University Conference on Language Development Vol. 30 60–71 (Cascadilla Press, 2006).
Arunachalam, S., Escovar, E., Hansen, M. A. & Waxman, S. R. Out of sight, but not out of mind: 21-month-olds use syntactic information to learn verbs even in the absence of a corresponding event. Lang. Cogn. Process. 28, 417–425 (2013).
Arunachalam, S. & Waxman, S. R. Meaning from syntax: evidence from 2-year-olds. Cognition 114, 442–446 (2010).
Yuan, S. & Fisher, C. ‘Really? She blicked the baby?’ two-year-olds learn combinatorial facts about verbs by listening. Psychol. Sci. 20, 619–626 (2009).
Yuan, S., Fisher, C. & Snedeker, J. Counting the nouns: simple structural cues to verb meaning. Child Dev. 83, 1382–1399 (2012).
Naigles, L. R. The use of multiple frames in verb learning via syntactic bootstrapping. Cognition 58, 221–251 (1996).
Scott, R. M. & Fisher, C. Two-year-olds use distributional cues to interpret transitivity-alternating verbs. Lang. Cogn. Process. 24, 777–803 (2009).
Kline, M., Snedeker, J. & Schulz, L. Linking language and events: spatiotemporal cues drive children’s expectations about the meanings of novel transitive verbs. Lang. Learn. Dev. 13, 1–23 (2017).
Arunachalam, S. & Dennis, S. Semantic detail in the developing verb lexicon: an extension of Naigles and Kako (1993). Dev. Sci. 22, e12697 (2019).
Kako, E. The semantics of syntactic frames. Lang. Cogn. Process. 21, 562–575 (2006).
Bowerman, M. Evaluating competing linguistic models with language acquisition data: implications of developmental errors with causative verbs. Quad. Semant. 3, 5–66 (1982).
Beller, A. & Gerstenberg, T. Causation, meaning, and communication. Psychol. Rev. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000548 (2025).
Noveck, I. A. When children are more logical than adults: experimental investigations of scalar implicature. Cognition 78, 165–188 (2001).
Papafragou, A. & Musolino, J. Scalar implicatures: experiments at the semantics–pragmatics interface. Cognition 86, 253–282 (2003).
Huang, Y. T. & Snedeker, J. Semantic meaning and pragmatic interpretation in 5-year-olds: evidence from real-time spoken language comprehension. Dev. Psychol. 45, 1723–1739 (2009).
Stiller, A. J., Goodman, N. D. & Frank, M. C. Ad-hoc implicature in preschool children. Lang. Learn. Dev. 11, 176–190 (2015).
Bohn, M., Tessler, M. H., Merrick, M. & Frank, M. C. How young children integrate information sources to infer the meaning of words. Nat. Hum. Behav. 5, 1046–1054 (2021).
Bohn, M., Tessler, M. H., Merrick, M. & Frank, M. C. Predicting pragmatic cue integration in adults’ and children’s inferences about novel word meanings. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 151, 2927–2942 (2022).
Bohn, M. & Frank, M. C. The pervasive role of pragmatics in early language. Annu. Rev. Dev. Psychol. 1, 223–249 (2019).
Walsh, C. R. & Sloman, S. A. The meaning of cause and prevent: the role of causal mechanism. Mind Lang. 26, 21–52 (2011).
Sytsma, J., Livengood, J. & Rose, D. Two types of typicality: Rethinking the role of statistical typicality in ordinary causal attributions. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. C 43, 814–820 (2012).
Livengood, J. M., Sytsma, J. & Rose, D. Following the fad: folk attributions and theories of actual causation. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 8, 273–294 (2017).
Alicke, M. D. Culpable causation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 63, 368–378 (1992).
Alicke, M. D., Rose, D. & Bloom, D. Causation, norm violation, and culpable control. J. Philos. 108, 670–696 (2012).
Kominsky, J. F. & Phillips, J. Immoral professors and malfunctioning tools: counterfactual relevance accounts explain the effect of norm violations on causal selection. Cogn. Sci. 43, e12792 (2019).
Hitchcock, C. & Knobe, J. Cause and norm. J. Philos. 11, 587–612 (2009).
Icard, T. F., Kominsky, J. F. & Knobe, J. Normality and actual causal strength. Cognition 161, 80–93 (2017).
Samland, J. & Waldmann, M. R. How prescriptive norms influence causal inferences. Cognition 156, 164–176 (2016).
Lombrozo, T. Causal–explanatory pluralism: how intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. Cogn. Psychol. 61, 303–332 (2010).
Lagnado, D. A. & Channon, S. Judgments of cause and blame: the effects of intentionality and foreseeability. Cognition 108, 754–770 (2008).
Ammon, M. S. & Slobin, D. I. A cross-linguistic study of the processing of causative sentences. Cognition 7, 3–17 (1979).
Kushnir, T. & Gopnik, A. Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in causal learning: preschoolers use new contingency evidence to overcome prior spatial assumptions. Dev. Psychol. 43, 186–196 (2007).
Gopnik, A., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E. & Glymour, C. Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation. Dev. Psychol. 37, 620–629 (2001).
Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B. & Gopnik, A. Children’s causal inferences from indirect evidence: backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. Cogn. Sci. 28, 303–333 (2004).
Schulz, L. E. & Sommerville, J. God does not play dice: causal determinism and children’s inferences about unobserved causes. Child Dev. 77, 427–442 (2006).
Samland, J., Josephs, M., Waldmann, M. R. & Rakoczy, H. The role of prescriptive norms and knowledge in children’s and adults’ causal selection. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 145, 125–130 (2016).
Hood, L., Bloom, L. & Brainerd, C. J. What, when, and how about why: a longitudinal study of early expressions of causality. Monogr. Soc. Res. Child Dev. 44, 1–47 (1979).
Bebout, L. J., Segalowitz, S. J. & White, G. J. Children’s comprehension of causal constructions with ‘because’ and ‘so’. Child Dev. 51, 565–568 (1980).
McCabe, A. & Peterson, C. A naturalistic study of the production of causal connectives by children. J. Child Lang. 12, 145–159 (1985).
Peterson, C. & McCabe, A. Understanding ‘because’: how important is the task? J. Psycholinguist. Res. 14, 199–218 (1985).
Hickling, A. K. & Wellman, H. M. The emergence of children’s causal explanations and theories: evidence from everyday conversation. Dev. Psychol. 37, 668–683 (2001).
Davies, M. The Corpus of Contemporary American English. English-Corpora.org https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ (2008).
Nadathur, P. & Lauer, S. Causal necessity, causal sufficiency, and the implications of causative verbs. Glossa 5, 49 (2020).
Bürkner, P.-C. brms: an R package for Bayesian multilevel models using Stan. J. Stat. Softw. 80, 1–28 (2017).
Rose, D. et al. Materials for the paper "How children map causal verbs to different causes across development". GitHub https://github.com/davdrose/cause_burn_development (2025).
Livengood, J. & Machery, E. The folk probably don’t think what you think they think: experiments on causation by absence. Midwest Stud. Philos. 31, 107–127 (2007).
Degen, J. The rational speech act framework. Annu. Rev. Linguist. 9, 519–540 (2023).
Goodman, N. D. & Frank, M. C. Pragmatic language interpretation as probabilistic inference. Trends Cogn. Sci. 20, 818–829 (2016).
Frank, M. C. & Goodman, N. D. Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games. Science 336, 998 (2012).
Degen, J., Hawkins, R. D., Graf, C., Kreiss, E. & Goodman, N. D. When redundancy is useful: a Bayesian approach to “overinformative” referring expressions. Psychol. Rev. 127, 591–621 (2020).
Bergen, L., Levy, R. & Goodman, N. Pragmatic reasoning through semantic inference. Semant. Pragmat. 10.3765/sp.9.20 (2016).
Clark, E. V. On the pragmatics of contrast. J. Child Lang. 17, 417–431 (1990).
Golinkoff, R. M., Jacquet, R. C., Hirsh-Pasek, K. & Nandakumar, R. Lexical principles may underlie the learning of verbs. Child Dev. 67, 3101–3119 (1996).
Diesendruck, G. & Markson, L. Children’s avoidance of lexical overlap: a pragmatic account. Dev. Psychol. 37, 630–641 (2001).
Halberda, J. The development of a word-learning strategy. Cognition 87, B23–B34 (2003).
Wolff, P., Barbey, A. K. & Hausknecht, M. For want of a nail: how absences cause events. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 139, 191–221 (2010).
Thanawala, H. & Erb, C. D. Revisiting causal pluralism: intention, process, and dependency in cases of double prevention. Cognition 248, 105786 (2024).
Shibatani, M. & Pardeshi, P. in The Grammar of Causation and Interpersonal Manipulation (ed Shibatani, M.) 85–126 (John Benjamins, 2002).
Ger, E. et al. Influence of causal language on causal understanding: a comparison between Swiss German And Turkish. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 210, 105182 (2021).
Douglas, B. D., Ewell, P. J. & Brauer, M. Data quality in online human-subjects research: comparisons between MTurk, Prolific, CloudResearch, Qualtrics, and SONA. PLoS ONE 18, e0279720 (2023).
Scott, K. & Schulz, L. Lookit (part 1): a new online platform for developmental research. Open Mind 1, 4–14 (2017).
de Leeuw, J. R. jspsych: a javascript library for creating behavioral experiments in a web browser. Behav. Res. Methods 47, 1–12 (2015).
Acknowledgements
We thank members of the Causality in Cognition Lab and the Markman Lab for feedback, as well as E. Bonawitz, E. Clark, H. Clark, M. Frank, N. Goodman, J. Kominsky, B. Levin and M. Srinivasan for helpful discussion. T.G. was supported by grants from Stanford’s Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence institute (HAI) and Cooperative AI. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
D.R., S.Z., S.N., E.M.M. and T.G. conceptualized the project and designed the methodology. D.R. S.Z. and T.G. developed software. D.R. and T.G. performed validation and conducted formal analysis. D.R. and S.Z. conducted investigation and curated data. D.R. wrote the original manuscript draft. D.R., S.N., E.M.M. and T.G. reviewed and edited the manuscript. D.R. and T.G. performed visualization. D.R., E.M.M. and T.G. supervised and administered the project. E.M.M. and T.G. acquired funding.
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
Peer review
Peer review information
Nature Human Behaviour thanks Jonathan Kominsky and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Peer review information are available.
Additional information
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Supplementary information
Supplementary Information
Preregistered analyses, order effect analysis and rational speech act model analyses.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Rose, D., Zhang, S., Nichols, S. et al. How children map causal verbs to different causes across development. Nat Hum Behav (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02345-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Version of record:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-025-02345-9


