Table 1 Classification of reviewed authentication protocols for IoD.
Category | Representative protocols | Key limitations |
|---|---|---|
Blockchain-Based | Wazid et al. (2021) 19, Karmegam et al. (2024) 20, Aggarwal et al. (2025) 21, Ju et al. (2024) 7 | High consensus overhead, latency, and energy consumption; communication/storage overhead unsuitable for lightweight UAVs. |
PUF-Based | Ayebie et al. (2023) 9, Chaudhry et al. (2024) 22, Choi et al. (2025) 23, Tian et al. (2022) 24 | Environmental susceptibility of PUF responses; need for fuzzy extractors and helper data increases storage/synchronization overhead; scalability issues in large swarms. |
ECC-Based | Jan et al. (2022) 25, Zhang et al. (2022) 26, Gupta et al. (2024) 8 | Scalar multiplication cost is high for UAVs; vulnerable to quantum attacks; not future-proof for long-term use. |
Other Notable Approaches | Son et al. (2024) 27, Zhao et al. (2024) 28, Kumar et al. (2024) 29, Kammoun et al. (2024) 30, Shariq et al. (2024) 31 | Partial quantum resistance or none; scalability and complexity challenges; lack of integrated lifecycle management. |
IoD-Specific AKE Protocols | Mahmood et al. (2024) 32, Lee et al. (2023) 33, Chaudhary et al. (2023) 34 | Lack of post-quantum security proof; no integrated key-update/revocation; limited scalability; informal-only security arguments. |