Table 3 Controller gains at \(\Delta N_{\varpi } (t)=0~(\varpi =1,2,3,4).\).

From: Extended dissipative truncated predictive control strategy for conic-type delayed networked control systems affected by cyber attacks and sensor distortion

Case

\(\nu\)

Gain K with DoSA

Gain K without DoSA

\(\mathbf {C_1}\)

2.17

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -52.6187& -14.9823\\ -29.9647& -90.6515 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -0.6490& -0.0777\\ -0.1555& -1.3755 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\mathbf {C_2}\)

2.3247

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -86.2462& -18.3122\\ -36.6244& -131.9170 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -0.7550& -0.0915\\ -0.1830& -1.5973 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\mathbf {C_3}\)

2.3247

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -85.4768& -18.9143\\ -37.8286& -131.0171 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -0.7532& -0.0963\\ -0.1925& -1.5698 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\mathbf {C_4}\)

-5

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -83.6166& -22.0134\\ -44.0269& -124.4191 \end{array}\right]\)

\(\left[ \begin{array}{cc} -0.7184& -0.0912\\ -0.1824& -1.5006 \end{array}\right]\)