Fig. 3: Sanctions and climate change mitigation.
From: Economic experiments support Ostrom’s polycentric approach to mitigating climate change
a Contribution per player of 9 players per group each subdivided into 3 fixed subgroups of 3 players investing individually in mitigation during each of 10 rounds (T4). Stippled line shows fair share of €2. b Contribution per player when each subgroup is offered to impose costly sanctions on another subgroup after each round (T3). c Percentage of subgroups per group investing the sub-target of €60, for fixed subgroups (blue) and for fixed subgroups with the opportunity to impose costly sanctions (pink) d Euros invested per group towards the global collective target of €180, see stippled line. e Selfish (€0), fair (€2) and generous (€4) contributions per player per round with fixed subgroups investing without sanction opportunity (blue), and with sanction opportunity (pink). f Selfish (0€) contributions per player in each round with fixed subgroups investing without sanction opportunity (blue), and with sanction opportunity (pink). See text for statistics, bars indicate standard errors.
