Table 2 Variable definition of the TEGM among central government and local governments.

C_A, C_B

Full implementation cost changes by local government A or B, compared with implementing incompletely.

Cc

Thorough inspection cost changes by the central government, compared with inspecting incompletely.

Q_A, Q_B

Changes in environmental loss between incomplete implementation and full implementation of APCP for local government A or B.

G_A, G_B

Changes in economic benefits between incomplete implementation and full implementation of APCP for local government A or B.

δ₁, δ₂

Weight of environmental indicators or economic indicators in the performance evaluation system. 0 < δ₁ < 1, 0 < δ₂ < 1.

R_A, R_B

Industrial transfer loss buried by full implementation of APCP for local government A or B, when local government B or A implements APCP incompletely.

T_A, T_B

Industrial transfer benefits for incomplete implementation of APCP for local government A or B.

W_A, W_B

Environmental loss for local government A or B, when local government B or A implements APCP incompletely.

M_A, M_B

Fiscal subsidy from the central government for local governments A or B that fully implements APCP.

F_A, F_B

Penalty amount imposed by the central government to the local government A or B, when the central government thoroughly inspects that the local government A or B does not implement APCP fully.

Fc

Environmental pressure and reputation loss to the central government when the central government does not thoroughly inspect.

H

Reputation benefits of the central government when the public finds that the air quality has improved and recognizes the work of the central government.

B

Bribed amount of rent-seeking corruption that the person in charge of the local government may obtain when not fully implementing the APCP.

λ

The proportion of rent-seeking corruption that has an impact on the benefits of local governments.