Table 5 Robustness test of removing samples.

Entrepreneurial orientation

0.0051^** (2.02)

0.0114^** (2.03)

0.0205^** (2.05)

0.0741^** (2.19)

0.0378^* (1.97)

0.0293^** (2.03)

CEO duality

0.4076 (0.30)

0.0289 (0.20)

Entrepreneurial orientation × CEO duality

0.0919^** (0.15)

0.1104^** (0.49)

Board independence

0.5786 (0.49)

0.2364 (0.45)

Entrepreneurial orientation × Board independence

0.7194^* (0.34)

0.5222^** (0.31)

Board ownership

0.2928 (1.06)

0.2227 (1.10)

Entrepreneurial orientation × Board ownership

−0.0171^* (−0.11)

−0.0185^* (−0.05)

Board size

−0.0036^* (−0.74)

−0.0051 (−0.23)

Entrepreneurial orientation × Board size

−0.0055^* (−0.11)

−0.0062 (−0.09)

Firm size

0.2960^*** (5.02)

0.3004^*** (5.03)

0.3492^*** (5.03)

0.2142^*** (5.02)

0.3228^*** (5.03)

0.2313^*** (5.02)

Firm age

0.0806 (7.32)

0.0801^* (7.31)

0.0816^*** (7.25)

0.0794 (7.36)

0.0706^** (7.57)

0.0863^*** (7.39)

Firm grow

0.9162^*** (0.93)

0.9161^*** (0.93)

0.9177 (0.93)

0.9163^** (0.93)

0.9144 (0.89)

0.9174 (0.87)

State ownership

0.0630 (1.58)

0.0377^* (1.57)

0.0691 (1.51)

0.1492^** (1.50)

−0.0407^* (1.54)

0.0695^* (1.50)

Leverage

−3.836^** (−2.01)

−3.8286 (−2.01)

−3.9400^** (−2.02)

−3.7805 (−2.00)

−3.2565^** (−1.92)

−0.1029 (−0.87)

Ownership concentration

−0.5443^* (−2.16)

−0.5372^* (−2.17)

−0.6639^* (−2.17)

−0.7248^* (−2.10)

−0.8669^* (−2.11)

−0.5085^** (−2.10)

Year effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R²

0.0534

0.0523

0.0520

0.0551

0.0508

0.0559

F

20.35^***

19.57^***

19.87^***

19.24^***

19.57^***

19.96^***

Hausman

107.20^***

97.68^***

100.02^***

99.47^***

88.67^***

103.66^***