Table 4 Results of OLS estimation using an alternative indicator for the governing elite, the head of village committee.
From: Collective action improves elite-driven governance in rural development within China
Response variable | Rural development | |
|---|---|---|
Explanatory variables | model 6 | model 7 |
Township government residence | −0.0235 (−0.61) | −0.0164 (−0.45) |
Landform | 0.0639*** (2.78) | 0.0519** (2.35) |
Total area | 0.1847 (1.23) | 0.2429* (1.71) |
Resident population | 0.2028*** (2.92) | 0.1996*** (3.02) |
Population density | 0.2520*** (3.63) | 0.2488*** (3.78) |
Proportion of permanent residents to registered population | −0.1282 (−0.72) | −0.0317 (−0.19) |
Construction land for village collective | 0.2573*** (2.72) | 0.2402*** (2.68) |
Arable land | 0.3105*** (3.24) | 0.2781*** (2.96) |
Land transfer | 0.0477 (1.16) | 0.0201 (0.51) |
Facility agriculture | 0.0060 (0.19) | −0.0289 (−0.94) |
Drainage and irrigation station | −0.0448 (−0.88) | −0.0248 (−0.51) |
Village collectives | 0.3834*** (2.93) | |
Farmer cooperatives | 0.1539*** (7.42) | |
Economic elite | 0.0244 (1.02) | 0.0052 (0.23) |
Governing elites (the head of village leadership committee) | 0.3628*** (6.10) | 0.2608*** (4.49) |
Constant | 9.6558*** (278.23) | 9.6511*** (290.40) |
Observations | ||
F | 102.77 | 105.11 |
Prob. > F | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
R2 | 0.7239 | 0.7530 |
