Table 2 Effects of anti-corruption campaigns on corruption levels (IV first stage).

From: Effects of anti-corruption campaigns on cesarean section rate: evidence from China

 

(1)

(2)

\({{AC}{I}}_{c,t-1}\,\)

−0.405***

 
 

(0.003)

 

\(\sum {{AC}{I}}_{c,t-1}\,\)

 

−0.112***

  

(0.002)

Age

−0.00001***

−0.00001***

 

(0.00000)

(0.00000)

Married

−0.00013***

−0.00011***

 

(0.00001)

(0.00001)

Occupation—being employed

−0.00001***

−0.00001***

 

(0.00000)

(0.00000)

Insurance—being insured

−0.00137***

0.00014***

 

(0.00005)

(0.00004)

Number of comorbidities

−0.00049***

−0.00048***

 

(0.00002)

(0.00002)

Number of births

−0.00004*

−0.00004**

 

(0.00002)

(0.00002)

City characteristics

Yes

Yes

City-fixed effects

Yes

Yes

Year-fixed effects

Yes

Yes

R-square

0.8014

0.8538

N

265,226

252,549

F-statistics

48,564

70,585

  1. This table summarizes the first-stage relationships. Column 1 uses city-year level of total number of officials being investigated (ACIt−1), column 2 uses the accumulated number of officials being investigated. Both regressors are rescaled by dividing 1000. Both regressions control population density, GDP per capita, consumption per capita, city-fixed effects, and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.
  2. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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